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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and understand the factors associated with 
effective social countermobilization against violent extremism. Understanding such 
factors can help a state develop a sponsored countermovement to protect its national 
interests against violent extremist movements. This thesis attempts to provide a strategy 
and framework by which to defeat violent extremist movements through the use of 
unconventional warfare techniques. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and understand the factors associated with 
effective countermobilization. Understanding such factors can help a state develop a 
sponsored countermovement to protect its national interests against violent extremist 
movements (VEMs). In addition, this thesis will cover whether countermobilization is a 
viable strategy for countering VEMs. It will address defining traits of a countermovement 
that can disrupt, destabilize, deteriorate or invalidate a targeted movement. The utility of 
countermobilization stems in part from the need to adopt strategies that limit a state’s 
vulnerabilities in a complex warfare environment. Furthermore, the study of 
countermobilization may highlight a more efficient way to militarily intervene against 
VEMs by utilizing a smaller special operations forces (SOF) footprint, within certain 
parameters, rather than a larger conventional force. 
A. LITERATURE  
This thesis will synthesize three major bodies of work from theory and doctrine: 
unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, and social movement theory. Literature exists 
on how social movements come into existence and how they succeed or fail based upon 
how they initially mobilize or how they gain and maintain popular support, but very little 
information exists on incorporating this theoretical analysis with unconventional warfare 
and counterterrorism techniques.  
The first major body of thought that informs the concept of countermobilization is 
social movement theory. This area of study is pertinent, because my research works 
under the theory that terrorism and insurgencies are just forms or different levels of 
violent movements.1 Social movements can be defined as “‘collective challenges’ by 
people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, 
opponents and authorities.”2 Social movements can encompass broad objectives such as 
                                                 
1 Daniel Byman, “Understanding Proto-insurgencies” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense 
Research Institute, 2007), vii. 
2 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4. 
 2 
regional control, regime change, or global dominance, or they may represent narrow-
based movements that may not even seek regime change. In either instance these 
movements must deal with elites, opponents, and/or authorities in order to reach their 
respective objectives, but in order to reach a level where a movement can interact with 
elites and authorities it must first mobilize into collective action. 
According to contemporary social movement theory, in particular the political 
process model, collective action for social movements is dependent upon four distinct 
variables: socioeconomic processes, political/social opportunity, narrative or interpretive 
framing, and extant mobilizing structures and/or organization.
3
 A movement is more 
likely to fail in its initial mobilization, or in sustained mobilization, without one or more 
of these factors in place. However, these variables pertain to the success of social 
movements, not countermovements. Although a countermovement is just another form of 
a social movement, a countermovement varies because of its target. Whereas a social 
movement generally targets political authorities, countermovements target other social 
movements. Therefore, a slight modification to the political process model is required. 
Countermobilization is a tailored version of the political process model, and because it 
derives from the political process model, it is important to understand the basics of the 
political process model in order to fully appreciate the mechanics of countermobilization. 
According to the political process model, the first variable for collective action is 
the socio-economic process, which is the ongoing process of engagement between 
movement groups and the larger sociopolitical environment they seek to reform.
4
 This 
can be brought about by conditions created by a war or the perceived disparity of 
economic value between the elites and an aggrieved populace. Examples of the process 
include “wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged 
unemployment, and widespread demographic changes.”5 This process is very fluid and 
can change at any time based on the ebb and flow of political or economic arrangements. 
                                                 
3 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), Kindle Location 1545. 
4 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1625–1628.  
5 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1650–1653. 
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Therefore, depending on the time and environment, the process affords various segments 
of the populace factors to exploit and gain leverage toward the achievement of goals and 
interests. The shifts in the broad socio-economic process have the potential to create a 
conducive political environment that can aid in the emergence of a movement and 
subsequently making them less vulnerable to reprisals and claims of illegitimacy. This 
potential is based on how well a movement does in regards to the second variable of the 
political process model, expanding its political opportunities. 
When a socio-economic process presents itself in a manner that is advantageous 
to a movement, a movement must exploit those conditions to expand its political 
opportunities, which thereby increases a movement’s political strength, bargaining 
position, and ability to execute a combine pursuit of its objectives.
6
 Political opportunities 
can be divided into two categories: stable and volatile. Stable opportunity structures refer 
to institutions or organizations that serve as the foundations of a specified system, such as 
strength of political institutions or strength of social cleavages. This form is in contrast to 
volatile opportunity structures that encompasses attributes susceptible to “shifts in 
political alliances, divided elites, or capacity for social control.”7  
However, a conducive political environment and additional political opportunities 
only affords the aggrieved population the opportunity for a successful movement. It is the 
resources of the minority community and the movement’s infrastructure that enable it to 
exploit these opportunities.
8
 Therefore, an aggrieved populace requires an organized 
community that draws from indigenous social infrastructures in order to form into a 
collective “voice” against the opposition. These initial organizations give a movement an 
existing pool of resources such as members, solidary incentives, communicative 
networks, and leaders,
9
 and from these indigenous organizations a movement should 
form into a formal movement organization in order to apply sustained political challenge. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1694–95. 
7 Eitan Y. Alimi, “Mobilizing Under the Gun: Theorizing Political Opportunity Structure in a Highly 
Repressive Setting,” Mobilization: An International Journal 14, no. 2 (2009): 221. 
8 McAdam, Political Process, Kindle Locations 1704–1706. 
9 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1711–1790. 
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The last variable in developing a movement is the narrative and its interpretive 
framing. This process is essential to collective action, because without it the other factors 
only produce a “structural potential” for collective political action. The narrative and the 
strategic framing produces the subjective meaning or “consciousness” of the movement 
that mediates between the opportunity and the action.
10
 The framing process “assigns 
meaning to and interprets relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to 
mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to 
demobilize antagonists.”11 A narrative should be general enough to account for various 
shifts in the socio-political environment. The movement’s consciousness is built upon the 
foundation of grievances and should be the compass from which the movement’s identity 
and will to mobilize is fostered. If the narrative is too narrowly focused, it will only 
attract a narrow amount of elites and followers. A narrative should seek to not only 
appeal to the initial supporters, but should be constructed to attract fence-sitters, 
international groups, and even oppositional supporters. This effect is created by 
constructing a narrative that addresses the central threat to the whole system from which 
a multitude can identify with. 
In essence, the political process model suggests that both internal and external 
factors attribute to the success of a social movement. Specifically, it is the confluence of 
the aforementioned factors that facilitate the emergence of a social movement in its 
attempt towards achieving a political or social objective.
12
 
The term “countermobilization” has been taken from an article by James M. 
Jasper and Jane Poulsen entitled “Fighting Back: Vulnerabilities, Blunders, and 
Countermobilization by the Targets in Three Animal Rights Campaigns,” which suggests 
that success or failure of a social movement is not only due to the tactics and 
characteristics of protest groups or the responses of the state, but also from the 
                                                 
10 Ibid., Kindle Location 1797.  
11 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant 
Mobilization,” International Social Movement Research 1, no. 1 (1988): 198.  
12 McAdam, Political Process, Kindle Location 2004–2008. 
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characteristics and responses of oppositional organizations.
13
 For this thesis, 
countermobilization is a state-driven response to engage a targeted movement that may 
be operating directly against the state or indirectly against the state by threatening allies 
or neutrals tied to the state’s interests. This is where the doctrine of unconventional 
warfare becomes relevant.14 When a state supports an insurgency it can offer groups 
respite from oppositional security forces and introduce some of the benefits of state 
infrastructure to the sponsored group.
15 
I argue that the same benefits apply to the state 
sponsorship of a countermovement. A countermovement can benefit from the support and 
resources attributed by the alignment with a state sponsor. 
Countermobilization, however, suggests a transition from the traditional concept 
of UW, which suggests a more violent or armed resistance. It underlines approaches that 
employ non-violent methods or a mixture of non-violent and violent resistance 
movements to achieve political objectives. Furthermore, countermobilization suggests a 
focus on identifying and locating movements, groups, organizations, and brokers that can 
achieve desired objectives through these various approaches. Coupled with social 
movement theory, UW can focus on a process that involves understanding and infiltrating 
existing social networks and movements in an attempt to organize appropriate 
communities, groups, and institutions into one “complex” organizational structure. 
Furthermore, social movement theory not only provides UW planners with a better 





                                                 
13 James M. Jasper and Jane Poulsen, “Fighting Back: Vulnerabilities, Blunders, and 
Countermobilization by the Targets in Three Animal Rights Campaigns,” Sociological Forum 8, no. 4 
(1993): 640. 
14 Unconventional warfare is activities conducted to enable resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an 
underground, auxiliary and force in a denied area; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations (Joint 
Publication 3-05) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). 
15 Byman, Understanding Proto-insurgencies, 16–17. 
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outlook on the importance of developing narratives, how to organize an infrastructure, 
and the type of brokers a movement needs to exploit in order increase its effectiveness 
against VEMs that threaten the sponsor states’ interests.16  
Countermobilization can also be an important element of counterterrorism. 
Andrew Phillips, in his work “How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq,” analyzes the conflict in Iraq and 
illustrates the strength of alternative methods that focuses on empowering local allies to 
weaken VEMs. In particular, he noted that VEMs tend to rely on propaganda, patronage, 
and terror in an attempt to impose their agenda on the local populace. This tendency for 
VEMs to rely on the use of terror results in a higher potential for the exploitation of a 
schism between the VEM and the local populace.
17
 By distancing the VEM from the 
local populace, this creates an opportunity to empower the local community, thereby 
denying a potential pool for resources (e.g., safe havens, recruits, food). Daniel Byman 
summarizes this concept of strengthening local communities in his Understanding Proto-
Insurgencies: 
…opposing proto-insurgencies must recognize the proto-insurgents’ many 
weaknesses and avoid an overreaction that may inadvertently strengthen 
the group. Perhaps the best and most efficient way to prevent proto-
insurgents from gaining ground is through ‘in-group’ policing. Individual 
communities know their own members, particularly in tight-knit societies 
in the developing world. These communities thus make intelligence-
gathering easier and enable the use of arrests or other forms of pressure 
with far greater discrimination. In-group policing, of course, requires a 
government to make political concessions to them.18  
Andrew Phillips’ work also suggests that by separating the populace from the 
VEM, it creates an opportunity to take brokers from the targeted movement. This is 
important for counterterrorism, because it highlights the importance of competition for 
popular support. Many or all actors involved directly compete for popular support 
                                                 
16 Dowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare 26, no. 3 
(2013): 31–33. 
17 Andrew Phillips, “How al Qaeda Lost Iraq,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 
(2009): 64–84. 
18 Byman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, ix. 
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whether through actions, strategic communications, or other mechanics.
19
 Most, if not all, 
movements begin as informal networks, and these informal networks must organize 
effectively and gain popular support in order to gain momentum.
20
 Therefore, if a state 
or, in this instance, a countermovement can attract more brokers and popular support 
while creating a division and denying the oppositional movement a popular support base, 
it has a greater potential to overcome and render the targeted movement ineffective.  
These two key lessons learned from counterterrorism studies are the benchmark 
for the UW teams’ sponsored countermovement. In order to successfully counter a VEM, 
the countermovement must not only begin with an indigenous popular base, but it must 
pull brokers from the competing movement in order to become the prominent “ideal.” 
This is achievable by infiltrating key organizations and informal connective structures in 
order to gain intelligence on the oppositional movement. The information gained can be 
used to identify key leaders and/or power brokers that are instrumental in the targeted 
movement’s processes. The information gained will also assist in determining what key 
topics and themes motivate a particular community or society. Additionally, through 
infiltration of the social and political systems the countermovement gains access, tools 
and influence that allow it to flourish into a robust organization. 
B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
While there is a lot of research on counterterrorism, social movements, and 
revolutions, little systemic research exists towards explaining how to successfully counter 
social movements with a countermovement. The proposed model is a modified version of 
McAdam’s political process model. It is tailored to explain the variables for countering 
social movements: expanding political opportunities, “complex” organizational structure, 
and the counter-narrative and framing process. Although this is an adaptation from the 
political process model, it stays true to the core aspect that both internal and external 
                                                 
19 Paul K. Davis et al., Understanding and Influencing Public Support for Insurgency and Terrorism, 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2012)  
20 David Martin Jones, Ann Lane, and Paul Schulte, Terrorism, Security and the Power of Informal 
Networks (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2010), 31. 
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factors attribute to the success of a movement, whether it is a social movement or a 
countermovement. My first hypothesis is that a countermovement must identify and 
exploit positive shifts in the socio-political environment to steal and align with more 
powerful political groups and brokers from oppositional and neutral parties than the 
targeted movement. 
1. Expanding Political Opportunity  
An increased presence of protesters and/or social movements is an indication that 
the opportunity structure in a particular political environment is flexible and vulnerable to 
the political assaults of discounted groups.
21
 By exploiting the favorable shifts in the 
structure of political opportunities, a social movement has the potential to garner 
additional political support and increase the likelihood of successful mobilization.
22
 
However if a countermovement can counteract the process in which a social movement 
can expand its political opportunities, a countermovement can exploit conditions to 
expand its own political opportunities and support. By garnering additional political 
support, a countermovement inherits increased political strength and bargaining position 
that the targeted social movement would have achieved while in pursuit of its group 
objectives.
23
 This development makes it less likely that the countermovement will suffer 
from political reprisals or open attacks due to risks associated with engaging the 
countermovement. While operating within the ebb of contention, a countermovement can 
be targeted with relative latitude, but increased political leverage makes the 
countermovement less vulnerable to overt attacks.
24
 
The countermovement must either wait for a favorable political shift or influence 
conditions that place the countermovement in a desirable position. A countermovement 
can influence contention and mold political conditions in three ways: 
                                                 
21 Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” American Political 
Science Review 67 (1973): 11–28. 
22 McAdam, Political Process, Kindle Locations 1694–95. 
23 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1694–95. 
24 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1696–1703. 
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 by choosing specific frames for attaching meaning to events 
 by tactically embracing specific modes of contention in order to maximize 
political leverage 
 through organizational structures that link the center to the base of the 
movement and assure its interaction with power holders.25 
Once favorable conditions are met, a countermovement’s associated institutions and 
organizations can protect it more effectively against reprisals and mitigate preexisting 
vulnerabilities and blunders from being exploited by the opposition.
26
  
Vulnerabilities is a term that refers to preexisting conditions such as general 
characteristics or practices of an organization that can influence public opinion, 
regulators, and elected officials, whereas the term blunders is reserved for misguided 
reactions to criticism, attacks, or protests. Both vulnerabilities and blunders can occur at 
the organizational level, such as in its official stance towards a policy or controversy, or 
at the sublevel of a specific development under attack, such as a particular tactic or 
facility used while engaging in contention.
27
 These vulnerabilities and blunders are 
conditions and actions open for interpretation, and depending on the audience, the 
interpretation may have positive or negative effects for a countermovement. Therefore 
the sponsoring state must ensure that the countermovement addresses expanding political 
opportunities in regards to domestic support and international support. 
2. “Complex” Organizational Strength 
My second hypothesis suggests that a countermovement must not rely solely on 
indigenous organizations, it must steal influential brokers from oppositional and neutral 
parties. The addition of more influential brokers into a “complex” organizational 
structure that relies on the integration of formal and informal networks will facilitate the  
 
 
                                                 
25 Alimi, “Mobilizing Under the Gun,” 221. 
26 Jasper and Poulsen, “Fighting Back,” 643. 
27 Ibid., 642.  
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mobilization and sustainment of a countermovement. Because countermovements are 
focused against social movements, it is important to first look at how organizational 
structures affect social movements. 
It is imperative to stress the importance of the statement expressed by McAdam in 
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency that eloquently states, “A 
conducive political environment only affords the aggrieved population the opportunity 
for successful insurgent action. It is the resources of the minority community that enable 
insurgent groups to exploit these opportunities.”28 Therefore, the establishment of 
political conditions is all for naught, if a movement is not organized to capitalize on the 
presented events and conditions of increased leverage and support. For example, 
following events that began on January 25, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood were able to 
capitalize on the dissolution of the Mubarak regime and rise to power due to its 
organizational structure.29 The Muslim Brotherhood was reluctant to join the protests 
until the protests progressed into a massive mobilization, and even throughout the 
uprising the Muslim Brotherhood was content on limiting its role to participatory efforts 
rather than taking the lead.
30
 However, due to the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational 
composition and strength, the brotherhood was able to align itself with key political 
figures and posture itself in a position that won the organization 47 percent of the 
legislative votes and over 50 percent of the presidential vote that put Mohammed Morsi 
in the Egyptian presidency.31  
Tarrow offers three different aspects of movement organization that facilitate the 
construction of a robust model:
32
 (1) formal hierarchical organization: “a complex, or 
formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or 
                                                 
28 McAdam, Political Process, Kindle Locations 1704–1709.  
29 “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Victim of its Own Success,” Middle East Policy Council, 
accessed May 21, 2014, http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/muslim-brotherhood-
egypt-victim-its-own-success 
30 Ferry de Kerckhove, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Spring” (SW Calgary, Alberta: 
Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2012), 1–2. 
31 Kerckhove, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Spring,” 1–2. 
32 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 123.  
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a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals;”33 (2) the organization of 
collective action at the point of contact with opponents: organizations that consist of 
informal networks, clubs, and fraternities that are social networks intertwined within the 
base of society; (3) connective structures: links that bring the different parts of the 
movement’s structure together even in the event there is a lack of a formal organization 
or a non-representative formal organization. Although, these three aspects of 
organizational structure pertain to social movements, countermovements can use this as a 
frame for establishing an organizational structure and more. For countermobilization, the 
three aspects of movement organization offers a glimpse into how a countermovement 
should target an oppositional social movement.  
Countermovements should focus on identifying and exploiting the connective 
tissues that act as brokers and bridges between networks and organizations. Connective 
structures of a social movement are an essential feature, because of their role at 
facilitating the coexistence of movements and organizations as a single organization.34 
Without connective structures that connect formal organizations with grass-root 
movements, an organizational structure would be disjointed into different factions 
incapable of sufficient communication.35 Connective structures like brokers are 
important, because brokers are in a position to control the flow of resources within an 
organizational structure.36 Brokers also serve as critical constituents that have the access 
and placement to attract support from various social movements with different world-
views.37 The removal of key sets of actors acting as brokers is likely to disrupt the flow 
of resources of a targeted movement.38 The process of removing brokers can be executed 
                                                 
33 Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, eds., Social Movements in an Organizational Society (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), 20. 
34 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 124. 
35 Mario Diani, “‘Leaders’ or Brokers? Positions and Influence in Social Movement Networks,” in 
Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, ed. Mario Diani and Doug 
McAdam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 118. 
36 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 253. 
37 Diani, “‘Leaders’ or Brokers? Positions and Influence in Social Movement Networks,” 118. 
38 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 253. 
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by violent means (e.g., capture, kill) or by non-violent means. Rather than assassinating 
an influential broker, the exploitation of dissention within a targeted movement to compel 
a broker to join the countermovement could prove to be more beneficial. This type of 
process leads to my third hypothesis.  
3. Counter-narrative and Framing 
My third hypothesis claims that in order for a countermovement to steal brokers, 
it must establish an effective counter-narrative and framing process. Although related, the 
counter-narrative is different from the framing process. The counter-narrative focuses 
more on the consciousness or grievances per se, whereas the framing process takes into 
account that grievances can take on multiple disparities based on the interpretation by an 
individual, group, or culture.39 Therefore, the framing process is the method a utilized to 
“assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended 
to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to 
demobilize antagonists.”40  
In the process of developing a counter-narrative, a countermovement needs to 
focus on its own ideology while weakening the targeted movement’s support base. This is 
accomplished by developing an effective framing process that supports the counter-
narrative. A social movement’s framing process relies on motivational, diagnostic, 
prognostic frames to provide meaning and motivation to its narrative.41 Therefore, a 
successful counter-narrative should aim at engaging a social movement’s attempt to 
provide meaning and motivation. A successful counter-narrative should be aimed at two 
distinctive frames of a social movement: motivational and diagnostic.42 A 
countermovement needs to attack the targeted movement’s motivational frame, because a 
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social movement’s motivational frame serves as the moral call to action for the 
movement.43 The incentives social movements tend to use to prod for action rely on 
material, solidary, and moral inducements.44 Therefore, a countermovement should create 
a framing process that counters this approach. It must not only convince the populace that 
there is a moral imperative to join, it must articulate that its moral justification is more 
valid than the targeted movement’s justification. Classic examples of contention among 
motivational frames pit religion against nationalism (e.g., Hamas and PLO) or 
nationalism against tribalism (e.g., GIRoA and Afghan tribes).  
Whereas, a diagnostic frame focuses more on who to blame for existing 
conditions. Therefore, actions such as blunders committed by a targeted movement can 
be used to vilify a targeted movement’s actions and organization.45 For example, a 
diagnostic frame would counter a targeted movement’s appeal to the people that it is a 
pious organization by highlighting the targeted movement’s consistent associations with 
corrupt government officials, money embezzlement, and human trafficking. While in 
contrast, the countermovement will elevate its position by highlighting its credibility as a 
true vanguard organization.46 In this form of contention, popular intellectuals, political 
affiliates, and leadership structures become vulnerable targets of vilification and 
exaltation. By attacking the credibility of a movement’s ideological representative, a 
countermovement can weaken the integrity of the targeted movement.47 
To summarize the purpose of the counter-narrative and framing process, it is to 
portray the target movement’s ideology as illegitimate and irrelevant. The strategy of the 
framing process must remain flexible as the interaction between the countermovement, 
target movement, and state creates vulnerabilities to be exploited in an attempt to garner 
additional support. The cases associated with the success or failure of a countermovement 
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have the potential to enlighten factors that answer why some mobilize countermovements 
while others never manifest, why some have more longevity than others, and why some 
achieve no success and others achieve long-term societal success. From the issues 
brought to light in this discussion, it is apparent that both internal and external factors 
attribute to the success of a countermovement. Not only does a countermovement rely on 
the construction of a complex and connective organizational structure, the expansion of 
political opportunities, and requisition of societal resources, but the success or failure of a 
countermovement also remains with whether the counter-narrative and framing process 
are aligned and resonate in order to produce an effective and sustained effort. Therefore 
these must remain under extreme consideration in the execution of countermobilization. 
C. CASE STUDIES 
I will look at three cases with different outcomes. Sons of Iraq (SOI) is an 
example of success, the anti-Zapatista movement of failure, and Hamas as a mixed 
outcome. 
1. Case Study: Iraq (Sons of Iraq—AQI) 
This case is a successful model of countermobilization. On September 14, 2006, 
Sheikh Abdul Sattar Albu-Risha announced with 40 other sheiks from the Ramadi area 
the beginning of the Awakening.48 In the midst of the Awakening was a Sunni movement 
that became to be known as the Sons of Iraq. The Sons of Iraq were formed by Sunni 
tribesman to counter another Sunni-led organization, the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI 
was led by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and was gaining power and delivering crushing 
blows to surrounding villages in Al-Anbar and undermining U.S. forces efforts to 
stabilize and secure the region. However, the Sons of Iraq gained popular support and 
established a movement that successfully neutralized al-Zarqawi’s AQI cell.  
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(2013): 5. 
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2. Case Study: Mexico (Zapatista—Anti-Zapatistas) 
This case was a failure of countermobilization, because the state and the 
sponsored countermovement chose to focus on violent methods of engaging a targeted 
movement rather than developing a counter-narrative and framing process that allows the 
counter movement the opportunity to attract and/or pilfer elites and brokers from neutral 
and oppositional parties. This case is a cycle of contention between a state-sponsored 
countermovement characterized with protests, violence, and paramilitary activities 
against the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Zapatista/EZLN) that occurred 
predominantly in Chiapas, Mexico. The Zapatistas are considered to be a leftist group 
with a Marxist-Leninists ideology. Although there has always been a sense of contention 
between Mexico and the Zapatistas, they reached a new level of contention and declared 
war on the state of Mexico in 1994 in response towards the Mexican government’s 
political stance on indigenous rights, economic globalization, women’s rights, and 
perception of democracy.49
 
The anti-Zapatistas protesters were comprised of concerned 
cattle ranchers, coffee producers, businessmen, and civilians that would be affected by 
the economic or social impacts of a violent armed conflict. The anti-Zapatista movement 
also included rural communities and peasant organizations that supported the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), the ruling party in Mexico. The anti-Zapatistas and PRI were 
also linked to sponsored paramilitary groups that conducted violent attacks against 
Zapatista sympathizers.50 In the end, paramilitary groups like Paz y Justicia were 
disbanded while the Zapatista movement is still a current and growing movement deeply 
engrained within societal networks in Chiapas.  
3. Case Study: Israel (Hamas—Palestinian Liberation Organization) 
This case illustrates the potential negative effect when a sponsor loses control of 
or influence over the countermovement. The political competition between Hamas and 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is an example of a failed attempt to position 
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two movements against each other by a third party nation-state. Although the creation of 
Hamas was not directly constructed by Israel, the political competition between Hamas 
and the PLO was orchestrated by Israel’s efforts as it played more of a passive role 
towards Hamas. Israel tacitly allowed Hamas’ early activities and financial networking, 
which allowed Hamas to flourish.51 It was not until the late 80s, during the time of the 
Intifada,52 that Israel began to target Hamas as a potential threat, but by then, Hamas was 
deeply embedded into the Palestinian community and positioned to execute numerous 
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II. CASE STUDY 1: IRAQ (SONS OF IRAQ—AL-QA’IDA) 
In the previous chapter, a range of variables were identified as facilitating the 
success or failure of countermobilization through influencing not only the opportunities 
for successful counteractions by methods of framing but also through the organizational 
capacity to manipulate those opportunities. Therefore, the focus of analysis for the 
following case studies is clearly on the processes that determines the prospect of 
establishing a successful countermovement to include the interaction between the sponsor 
and the countermovement. 
The purpose of this case study is to compare factors associated with this particular 
empirical phenomenon to countermobilization: expanding political opportunities, 
“complex” organizational structure, and the counter-narrative and framing process. 
Moreover, the analysis of this case will illustrate the use of unconventional-style warfare 
and the execution of counterterrorism (i.e., focused on the local fight) with the desired 
effects of ascertaining positive and negative factors to either retain or circumvent in the 
execution of successful countermobilization.  
In this particular case study, I discuss the contention between SOI and AQI. This 
case study looks into how the U.S. military took advantage of a shift in the socio-political 
environment that led to U.S. forces’ sponsorship of the SOI Sunni movement, which 
consisted of individuals, groups, and tribes that were previously in armed conflict with 
U.S. and Coalition forces, to develop a countermovement that eventually achieved 
success by dismantling the targeted AQI movement. Specifically, I will discuss the 
conditions that shifted favor from AQI to the U.S. and Coalition forces, the 
organizational structure of SOI, the counter-narrative and framing process, and finally the 
sponsor-countermovement relationship that in discord began to pilfer brokers from the 
targeted AQI movement to the United States and the Government of Iraq (GOI). 
A. BACKGROUND 
On March 20, 2003, U.S. forces began the liberation of Iraq from Saddam 




 However, after initial successes, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM soon turned 
from what seemed to be an overwhelming U.S. victory into a protracted war 
characterized by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mounting U.S. casualties, and 
intense insurgent activities. The bloody insurgency that encapsulated Iraq was the result 
of multiple ill-fated policies implemented by Paul Bremmer and his staff: 1) Order No. 1 
“De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” which forbade the former top-level Ba’athist 
personnel, who were also the most experienced personnel in Iraq, from occupying any 
position in the new Iraqi government.
54
 Many Sunni perceived this as an open attempt to 
promote Shi’a dominance in Iraq.55 2) Order No. 2 “Dissolution of Entities,” which 
dissolved any formal existing security structures within Iraq and left many Iraqis jobless 
and searching for a means to live and/or survive.
56
 
The implemented policies created a consequential environment that was ripe for 
al-Qa’ida to exploit, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian and known “jihadist,” took 
advantage and merged his VEM known as Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn 
with al-Qa’ida in 2004 to form AQI.57 Many Sunnis aligned themselves with AQI under 
the condition of fear fashioned by a Shi’a-dominated government, which appeared to 
have the full support of U.S. forces.
58
 Regardless of whether tribal villages wanted to join 
AQI or not, the environment created conditions that drew the two entities towards a 
partnership. The jihadists needed a home, local intelligence, and resources provided by 
their hosts, while the tribes needed protection, finances, and influence.
59
 Even the 
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nationalist and Ba’athist insurgent organizations worked together with AQI amid the aim 
of expanding logistical, economic, and labor support.
60
 
Perhaps more troubling than this partnership to form an insurgency, was the U.S. 
strategy against the insurgency, which seemed to be vague and politically focused rather 
than in touch with realities on the ground. After years of fighting a bloody protracted war, 
U.S. and Coalition forces were in the process of transferring the command and control of 
the environment to untrained and ill-prepared Iraqi security forces and local police, while 
the police and government officials were still being assassinated at a devastating pace. 
Additionally, Iraqi soldiers had little influence and were still socially isolated from the 
populace, and the government was still littered with corrupt officials.
61
 In essence, the 
situation on the ground seemed to be unwinnable for U.S. forces and not in a position to 
transfer responsibilities to a government and military in its infancy. 
The grim situation soon saw a glimmer of hope as Iraq began to experience an era 
of “Awakening.” In an attempt to safeguard wide-spread collaboration, AQI conducted 
numerous atrocities and assassinations on those who resisted, to include prominent 
villagers and tribal leaders.
62
 Furthermore, in an effort to fund its activities, AQI 
committed theft and violent crimes to the extent that the organization earned a monthly 
revenue of more than $400,000 a month.
63
 These activities began to weigh heavily on the 
relationship between Sunni tribesmen and AQI, and even before the more recognizable 
Al-Anbar Awakening took place, sparks of contention between Sunni tribesmen and AQI 
arose in a small village located on a prominent position on the Iraq-Syria border, called 
Al Qaim. In an attempt to force AQI out of their village tribal militias in Al Qaim soon 
began to team up with Coalition forces. This unlikely union came to fruition after a series 
of violent acts culminated with the assassination of Major Ahmed Adiya Asaf, who was 
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the Chief of Police in Al Qaim.
64
 The AQI assaults were aimed at the villagers in Al 
Qaim in an attempt to ensure cooperation, however it had the opposite effect and incited 
tribes like Albu Mahal to actively resist AQI in armed contention. Although this early 
attempt at an “awakening” failed, it precluded and influenced subsequent actions of 
Sunni tribes in Al Anbar that led to the Al Anbar Awakening and the Iraq Awakening.
65 
 
The AQI assaults and atrocities aimed at both Shi’a and Sunni individuals and 
groups that resisted AQI’s presence and ideology were not isolated actions, and Iraqis in 
general finally awoke to the situation and began to mobilize numerous localized militias 
to put a stop to the atrocities. On September 14, 2006, Sheik Abdul Sattar Albu-Risha 
went one step further and announced the Sahawa—the Awakening, which initially 
involved 40 other sheiks from the Ramadi area whom gathered together to discuss the 
crisis. Their purpose of the meeting was to sign a proclamation to work with Coalition 
forces led by the United States in a campaign to expel AQI from the Al-Anbar province.
66
 
What started as the Al-Anbar Awakening soon spread to other villages, municipal cities, 
and provinces in Iraq. In 2007, Fallujah, which became infamous as an insurgent 
stronghold east of the Ramadi area in 2004, also experienced an Awakening as major 
tribes in Fallujah’s suburban and rural southern peninsula areas allied with U.S. and Iraqi 
forces to secure the city proper.
67
 Coupled with the subsequent U.S. “surge” of troops, the 
Awakening shaped conditions in Iraq that allowed for the United States to hand over 
control of Iraq to the new Iraqi government. 
B. EXPANDING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
The conclusion of U.S. forces’ role in the Iraq war did not come to fruition at the 
behest of some random acts. There were a series of events that created conditions to 
allow for a countermovement to take place followed by appropriate decisions and actions 
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that took advantage of the existing conditions. The first conditional variable is how SOI 
exploited shifts in the socio-political environment to expand political opportunities in 
order to defeat AQI. 
 In 2005, the United States’ diplomatic policy in Iraq shifted to encouraging Sunni 
participation in Iraqi governance. This was in contrast to its earlier policy that took a “de-
Ba’athafication” approach, which led to a January 2005 Sunni-boycott of Iraqi 
elections.
68 
This change of policy was a spark of hope for the Sunnis in Iraq, as they now 
had increased political influence in the governance of Iraq. Furthermore, AQI gave the 
Coalition forces, to include GOI, an opportunity to change the balance of power towards 
the Coalition’s favor and under terms Coalition forces would enjoy.69 Tension developed 
between the Sunni population and AQI, which created dissention and an opportunity for 
the U.S. forces to capitalize on, but the opportunity was not enough. The identification of 
the shift was essential for the United States in establishing a relationship with the 
potential AQI-countermovement. U.S. forces in Al Qaim received plenty of corroborated 
intelligence from multiple sources that described the situation on the ground that depicted 
a shift in the socio-political process. Sunni tribesmen were beginning to shift their 
perception from AQI being the source of protection to U.S. forces, as described by a 
Marine Captain in Al Qaim: 
We were getting frantic phone calls: ‘We’re getting run over.’ And then 
perhaps the most surreal moments…we saw in the hundreds, Iraqis come 
out of the north end of the city towards our OP [outpost]…with their 
hands up. They are now coming in full daylight out of the city towards our 
OP with their hands up. Ali, our contact, was calling us saying, ‘These are 
my people; please help them. We’re getting killed.’70 
As far as the anti-AQI movement was concerned, once they realized that they 
could not defeat AQI on their own, they reached out to the U.S. military for support. This 
was the political expansion the anti-AQI movement required to increase its likelihood of 
defeating AQI. Once the anti-AQI movement formally joined with U.S. and Coalition 
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forces to rid AQI from their villages, they gained valuable support and protections. The 
U.S. forces, who were the benefactors of SOI, also experienced positive effects from this 
union. U.S. forces increased its level of influence in the region from one purely reliant on 
the Iraqi central government to one augmented with the local tribes of Iraq.  
In terms of countermobilization, this case is a prime example of how important it 
is to understand the environment in order identify advantageous shifts in the ebb and flow 
of contention. For SOI, the change in the de-Ba’athafication policy illustrated that U.S. 
forces were not in Iraq to suppress the Sunnis. Additionally, the situation on the ground 
made AQI a bigger threat than the U.S. forces. When Sunni leaders saw U.S. policies and 
actions shift towards Sunni involvement, the Sunni leadership went to U.S. forces to aid 
them in a fight against AQI. The Sunni tribesmen understood their position was worse 
under AQI’s authority and decided to align U.S. forces and GOI. The expanded political 
opportunity that SOI was granted provided the countermovement with top-cover, 
legitimacy, and material support that eventually led to its success against AQI. For U.S. 
forces, identification of dissention between AQI and the Sunni tribal leadership led 
towards the United States’ expansion of regional political strength that included the Iraqi 
tribal leaders. This afforded the U.S. military local protections and securities that the 
local militias and tribes could provide the Coalition forces. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The expansion of political opportunity was not the only factor that facilitated in 
the success of SOI as a countermovement. In this section, I discuss how the 
organizational structure of the SOI helped itself and the United States achieve their aims. 
In particular, I examine how Coalition forces and SOI’s ability to compel key brokers to 
join the countermovement facilitated towards the neutralization of AQI. 
 As described earlier, the Marines were able to exploit the friction on the ground, 
because of sources that were embedded within the local networks. This allowed the U.S. 
forces to act appropriately and support the Sunni tribesmen who eventually became the 
anti-AQI countermovement. Units such as the U.S. Army Special Forces Operational 
Detachments began to redeploy into the area with the purpose of operating by, with and 
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through indigenous Iraqis in order to help them secure their local villages.
71
 1-1 AD also 
began to work with Thawar Al Anbar (TAA), a local anti-AQI countermovement 
operating within the Ramadi area.
72
 Moreover, U.S. forces understood who the power 
brokers were in the area, and were able to identify the brokers who had the most 
influential presence to assist in the mobilization of a countermovement. This was evident 
in COL MacFarland’s relationship with Sheik Sittar abu Risha. After a series of attacks 
and atrocities committed by AQI, COL MacFarland met with Sheik Sittar in order to 
discuss the developing situation. After multiple talks with COL MacFarland, Sheik Sittar 
eventually met with a sizeable amount of sheiks from the region. The sheiks were all 
leaders who united under Sheik Sittar’s prose. “If we don’t stand up together, Al-Qaeda is 
going to pick us apart one by one, like they did last time,” is the language Sheik Sittar 
used to motivate the power brokers after the murder of fellow sheik, Sheik Khaled.
73
 
From under the brokerage potential of Sheik Sittar, the Awakening emerged in the 
Ramadi area, and U.S. forces had additional resources in the war against AQI. 
Sheik Sittar served did not serve as a prominent leader in AQI’s network, 
however he was a powerful broker that was able to attract and link multiple tribal 
networks together. Exploiting the dissention between the AQI network and Sunni tribes 
did not afford Coalition forces access into AQI’s network, but it did isolate the link the 
two dissenting faction from each other. By taking a non-violent approach and compelling 
Sheik Sittar into joining a countermovement against AQI, it linked the GOI and U.S. 
forces in with the local informal networks associated with Sheik Sittar. More than 4,000 
local volunteers joined in support of local Iraqi security forces, in only a six-month 
period.
74
 The establishment of a countermovement embedded within the social fabric of 
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the local Iraqi culture and society, benefitted U.S. and Coalition forces to a new range of 
information and intelligence that led to increased freedom of movement. By December 
2006, U.S. forces’ casualties and the number and quality of IEDs in Anbar province 
dropped a considerable amount while the amount of cache exploitations increased in the 
area.
75
 The level of success gained from the integration of local militia forces with 
powerful hierarchical organizations emphasizes the importance of stealing powerful 
brokers will serve as the connective tissues between networks in a countermovement. 
When conducting countermobilization it is essential to identify and exploit powerful 
brokers. As in the case with Coalition forces, the United States and GOI definitely had 
the manpower and support to defeat AQI, but they lacked the information required to 
destroy a sufficient amount of caches, operating cells, and AQI leaders. In contrast, the 
local informal networks had the information necessary to target AQI, but it lacked the 
resources and support needed to directly engage AQI. Once Coalition forces gained the 
connective structures that allowed for the development of a “complex” organizational 
structure, the countermovement could successfully engage AQI.  
D. COUNTER-NARRATIVE AND FRAMING PROCESS 
But how did the United States pilfer brokers from AQI? This was achievable by 
the establishment of an effective counter-narrative and framing process. The 
establishment of a counter-narrative was inevitable under the conditions afforded in Iraq. 
One of the main reasons the relationship between AQI and the Iraqi population in Al 
Anbar were at risk of divorce was due to a major variance in ideology. 
The ambition of al-Qaeda itself forced a large section of Anbar’s 
population to reject it. As the ideological zeal of its leaders became more 
intense, the organization tried to enforce its own austere version of Salafist 
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members religiously and culturally from their hosts. Anbar’s own Islamic 
traditions are diverse, with a substantial number of Anbaris following Sufi 
approaches to Islam…76 
As stated, AQI’s forceful approach isolated the Anbaris from its organization. 
This forceful approach created an environment of in-fighting amongst the insurgents, 
which created an opportunity for a countermovement to mobilize. What followed was the 
development of a framework that would further expose the disenfranchised pair and pilfer 
additional support in favor of U.S. and Coalition forces.  
The framing process during the “awakening” was two-fold, which both initially 
relied on pre-existing vulnerabilities, then on blunders when AQI attempted to regain 
control. First, the Iraqis enacted a motivational frame to rally a call to arms. The 
motivational frame involved tribal legitimacy and survival to motivate tribal leaders into 
forming a movement. This ploy associated “tribal” values and organization with the 
Anbar Awakening Council and drew distinction between the Anbari movement and the 
foreign Al-Qa’ida operatives.77 The U.S. forces also continued to drive wedges between 
AQI and the Sunni tribesmen through increased verbiage and support of the “tribal 
revolt.” Since the Anbaris were militarily weaker and less organized than AQI, the U.S. 
forces worked out a deal that allowed tribes to establish local militia in exchange for 
intelligence. U.S. and Iraqi security forces would carry out the majority of military 
actions that the local militias could not carry out, while the local militias provided the 
necessary intelligence for the execution of effective raids.78 
The appeal to tribalism was not a new strategy in Iraq. Saddam Hussein 
recognized the influential nature of tribes and used them to supplement his regime. 
Tribalism was also a motivational factor Saddam used to mobilize Shi’as, Sunnis, and 
Kurds during the Iran-Iraq war,
79
 and after the casualties his regime suffered in the 
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Persian Gulf War, he took on tribal leadership to maintain his influence over the Iraqi 
population.
80
 In some locations, the economic conditions of Iraq forced Saddam to treat 
tribal entities as the local authority or security force, because the Iraqi regime did not 
have the available resources to extend securities to remote areas. Therefore, Saddam 
created organizations like the Office of Tribal Affairs and a High Council of Tribal 
Chiefs to serve as links to his regime and tribal leadership.
81
 
The importance of a motivational frame was influential in the mobilization of 
SOI. “Tribalism” was, and is still today, a culturally historic network that is familiar to 
the people of Iraq. Saddam used this historical context to motivate the masses and 
strengthen his regime. Even though the presence of tribes has the potential to weaken the 
influence of the state, because locals adhere to the tribal leaderships’ standards, the 
appropriate use, integration, and control of tribes can protect the state as well. In this 
case, the dynamics of tribal influence proved to be a valuable asset in establishing 
security and resistance against Al-Qa’ida in Iraq. 
This lesson should be conceptualized in the execution of countermobilization. 
While mobilizing the population, it is essential to look towards historic mobilization 
efforts as they may be a way to motivate the population. It is important to leave some 
historical context in forming a new structure, because it can cause less of a culture shock 
and be viewed as more palatable than a drastic change. As was in the case with the 
Anbaris and tribalism. Furthermore, it is not only suffice to drive a wedge between the 
countermovement and the target movement. The sponsor must mold the relationship 
between itself and the countermovement in order to ensure that the sponsor has influence 
and can constantly frame the direction the movement is going. This will assist in the 
objective of ensuring that the countermovement continues to gain influence over the 
population, but the sponsor continues to gain influence over the countermovement.  
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E. UNITED STATES AND SOI 
In light of the effects achieved by the organizational structure that included SOI 
throughout Iraq, U.S. forces maintained a level of scrutiny and control in order to ensure 
SOI did not become more powerful than GOI and that SOI stay aligned with U.S. 
objectives. U.S. forces were instructed to locally screen all personnel associated with 
SOI. Additionally, SOI personnel took oaths and were recorded into biometric databases 
to mitigate the risk of infiltration and prevent reoccurrences of misfortunes from 
recruiting local personnel with AQI ties. SOI was deliberately limited, and U.S. forces 
were instructed not to provide ammunition or ordnance to SOI personnel.
82
 This allowed 
for the United States, being the sponsor, to maintain a level of influence over the 
countermovement, which is critical in countermobilization. The need to understand 
motivations, limitations, and strengths allows for the sponsor to control the movement’s 
level of attainable power. If the sponsor does not want to limit the size or influence of the 
countermovement, then it must be able to control the direction or objectives of the 
countermovement, which can be achieved through the manipulation or maintenance of a 
countermovement’s ideology and framing process. 
The Iraqi case study is a good example of how to sponsor a countermovement 
against a targeted movement. It emphasizes the need to not only drive a wedge between 
factions from within a movement, but it points towards the need to also maintain a 
relationship and control between the sponsor and beneficiary countermovement. The 
aforementioned qualities involved with the conduct of a sponsored countermovement are 
qualities that are important to incorporate in the execution of countermobilization. If 
these characteristics were not adhered to, it could cause either the countermovement to 
gain unnecessary powers and influence or lose direction from which the sponsor wants 
the countermovement to go.  
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F. FINDINGS 
To summarize the lessons learned from the U.S. interaction with SOI, I have 
highlighted key factors that pertain to the operation of conducting a sponsored 
countermovement: 1) The ability to react quickly when socio-political shifts present an 
advantageous environment that enables the sponsorship and mobilization of a 
countermovement against a targeted movement more likely to succeed. As in the case 
when Coalition forces saw a widening gap between the relationship of AQI and Sunni 
tribesmen. 2) The judgment to establish influential brokers who can serve as connective 
tissues between informal and formal networks and organizations. 3) The need to establish 
motivational and diagnostic frames that support the counter-narrative and attract key 
brokers to the countermovement and away from the targeted movement. 4) The insight 
for the sponsor to maintain continuing influence and control of the countermovement. It 
is essential for the sponsor to ensure the countermovement’s frame alignment is 
consistent with the sponsor’s objectives and that the countermovement does not become 
so powerful that it becomes unmanageable. 5) In contention against another movement, it 
is essential to focus on efforts at the local level. Whether a countermovement has local, 
regional, or transnational objectives the epicenter of the fight should be at the local level. 
Once local success is achieved it raises the likelihood that the countermovement will 
transcend into other levels of contention. In the end, a government is in competition for 
the support of the populace just as much as a movement is, so why solely entrust the 
government’s ability to win the populace over rather than earning the populace first. 
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III. CASE STUDY 2: MEXICO (ZAPATISTAS—ANTI-
ZAPATISTAS MOVEMENT) 
This case study examines the cycle of contention between the EZLN and the 
broader Zapatista movement in Chiapas against the counteractions that against them, 
which involved the Mexican government, military, and local landowners and 
paramilitaries. This case differs from the previous case, in that it analyzes a case where a 
state and a state-sponsored countermovement are unable to neutralize a targeted 
movement based on the strategy and tactics used. 
The purpose of this case study is to compare this case study with the factors 
associated with countermobilization: expanding political opportunities, “complex” 
organizational structure, and the counter-narrative and framing process. Moreover, the 
inductive analysis of this case facilitates in ascertaining negative factors to avoid in the 
execution of successful countermobilization.  
In particular, the highlights from this case study will illustrate that the response 
and focus of the government and its sponsored countermovement relied too heavily on 
violence and conducting counter-protests in areas already dominated by anti-Zapatista 
supporters, rather than developing a successful framing process that aimed at pilfering 
support from external brokers. Furthermore, this case study will also examine how the 
state and its sponsored countermovement failed to effectively address the portrayal of 
their ideology at all levels of contention., and how these failures effected the final 
outcome with Zapatista “autonomy” and the Mexican government’s inability to force the 
Zapatistas back into political alignment due to a certain level of protection gained by the 
Zapatistas. 
A. BACKGROUND 
On January 1, 1994, the same day as the official commencement of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion 
Nacional (EZLN) launched a rebellion in the southern state of Mexico, known as 
Chiapas. The EZLN assaulted and captured four cities in the Los Altos region of Chiapas, 
 30 
Mexico. Although, direct military confrontation between the EZLN and Mexican Army 
ended only after 12 days with the EZLN suffering a large amount of casualties, the 
Zapatista movement exploded onto the domestic and international stage.
83
 The purpose of 
the movement is to address the poor conditions associated with “jobs, land, housing, 
food, health, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace.”84 Furthermore, the 
Zapatista movement does not seek to overthrow the state or the regime, but seeks to shift 
“the balance of forces in favor of popular and democratic movements, thereby isolating 
and ultimately defeating anti-democratic tendencies within the ruling Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the state and the rest of society.”85 Prominent 
Mexican figures, like Emiliano Zapata, resonate through the ideology and historical base 
of the EZLN. Zapata directed what he entitled a “popular army,” the Ejercito Libertador 
del Centro y Sur—the Liberating Army of the Center and the South, and succeeded in 
mobilizing an oppressed agricultural population in southern and central parts of Mexico, 
and he had a rallying call of “Land and Liberty.”86 The EZLN’s association to Zapata 
also made his Plan de Ayala a cornerstone of EZLN ideology. Plan de Ayala envisioned 
the nationalization of land controlled by big landowners and the redistribution of these 
lands to the workers of the big landowners and other small farmers.
87
 
The actual core issues of EZLN reside in neoliberalism and indigenous rights. It is 
extremely unfavorable of neoliberal economic policies and the poor distribution practices 
of income.
88
 The EZLN view the consequences of neoliberalism as the principal global 
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threat confronting Mexicans. An example of such consequences was the amendment to 
Article 27 of the constitution, which codified the end of land reform in Mexico as it 
permitted the privatization of ejido plots and removed the guarantee that indigenous 
groups would receive land reparations.
89
 The result of the policy created a sense that the 
dream of possessing sufficient land for subsistence seemed further out of reach than ever 
for many residents of the Chiapas highlands and jungle.”90 Additionally, the passage of 
NAFTA, which initiated the spark for the rebellion, makes it virtually impossible for 
Indian peasants to compete with the high-tech productivity of U.S. companies, which all 
but spelled catastrophe for Indian peasant lives.
91
 
As the Zapatista cause and inherently the movement gained favor among 
sympathizers, it also gained opponents that began to start a counter-Zapatista movement. 
Initially, the Mexican government and military countered the Zapatista movement with 
military force, however the images of a disproportionate war between the Mexican army 
and the poorly-armed EZLN guerrillas that circulated through various media outlets 
generated a strong backlash of social protests and concerns. The perceived over-
aggressive nature of the response began to generate favorable attention towards the 
Zapatsita movement.
92
 A multitude of foreign activists associated with human-rights 
organizations, indigenous-rights groups, and other nongovernmental organization 
(NGOs) began to descend into Mexico to express sympathy and support for the 
movement and to push for a cease-fire, a military withdrawal, and negotiations between 
the EZLN and the Mexican government.
93
 This favorable momentum caused a 
mobilization of a counter-Zapatista movement that initially involved less violent methods 
of protests and demonstrations. These counter-Zapatista protesters were formed by 
concerned cattle ranchers, coffee producers, businessmen, and civilians that would be 
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affected by the economic or social impacts of a violent armed conflict. The counter-
Zapatista movement also included rural communities and peasant organizations that 
supported the PRI.
94
 The counter-Zapatista movements took a dramatic turn when some 
began to form locally armed pro-government paramilitary groups like Paz y Justicia. 
These paramilitary groups formed alliances with the PRI and conducted violent 
operations like the one in the village of Acteal in December of 1997, which targeted and 
killed numerous Zapatista sympathizers. Pro-Zapatistas took advantage of these atrocities 
that were the consequence of increased anti-Zapatista organizing that was permitted by 




Although, the Zapatista movement has entered into a type of a stalemate with the 
Mexican government, EZLN is still active in its attempts to garner additional brokers for 
its cause. The government has tried to generate partial or water-downed concessions in an 
attempt to pacify the movement, but EZLN continues to push for substantial changes. 
With the first form of concessions, the federal government suspended arrest warrants 
against rebel leaders, created autonomous Zapatista controlled areas (zonas francas), 
freed political prisoners, removed military checkpoints around pro- apatista 
communities, and created two mediation commissions. [One with representatives from all 
political parties in the legislature (Comisi n de Concordia y Pacificaci n or COCOPA  
and the other was formed by the Bishop of San Critobal de las Casas (Comisi n Nacional 
de Inter-mediaci n or CONAI . In addition to the federal government’s concessions, 
local governments increased expenditure of public works and social programs.
96
 
Furthermore, in 2001, EZLN rejected ineffective agreements, constructed by former-
President Vicente Fox (first non-PRI president of Mexico in 70 years), to end the 
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 This led towards EZLN’s creation of 32 “autonomous” municipalities in 
Chiapas. In essence, the Zapatistas have abandoned talks, politics, and all further contact 
with the state, and as an alternative, they have elected to concentrate on building their 
own autonomous, horizontal forms of self-government within their declared territories 
void of the Mexican government’s support.98  
Along with the declaration of autonomy from the Mexican government, the 
Zapatistas continue to disseminate their message of consciousness and contention aimed 
at domestic and international communities. On June 28, 2005, the EZLN released its 
Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle. In this declaration, the EZLN puts emphasis 
on its strategy to change in order to continue its struggle. In particular, the EZLN 
communicated its desires to create the “Other Campaign,” which is a campaign by 
Subcomadante Marcos that attempts to unite EZLN with existing Mexican resistance 
groups and social movements. EZLN also proposed support and aid to other international 
organizations that are resisting neoliberalism in their respective regions, and in return 
asks for a united front all over the world.
99
 This statement along with other recent 
messages and events sponsored by EZLN and the Zapatistas demonstrate that this 
movement is far from extinguished and continues to play its part in Mexican politics and 
culture. 
B. EXPANDING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES 
As expressed in the above synopsis of the contention involving pro-Zapatista and 
counter-Zapatista movements, there was clearly a continuing ebb and flow of momentum 
for each side to capitalize on. For the Mexican government and the counter-Zapatista 
movement, the 1994 EZLN assault into the Los Altos region of Chiapas should have been 
a gateway for garnering domestic and international support. In terms of expanding its 
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political opportunity, the counter-Zapatista movements aligned its organization with the 
ruling Mexican Party, which gave it top-cover from a domestic prospective. However, the 
top-cover received by the countermovements was not utilized properly. At the beginning 
of the conflict, the Mexican government and military responded with a disproportionate 
amount of military force, which definitely squashed the EZLN and pro-Zapatista 
supporters, but also gave them ammunition to change the shift towards their favor. 
Although this was perpetrated by the military and not the countermovement, the 
countermovement replicated these effects from 1997–1999 with increased armed 
conflicts and killings.
100
 These actions hurt the counter-Zapatista movement in garnering 
additional brokers from the international sphere of influence. These actions allowed for 
the Zapatistas to draw back on the past actions of the military and relate them to the 
actions of the countermovement. These violent counteractions facilitated the emergence 
of effects opposite from the desired purpose of the countermovement. Rather than 
“hurting” the Zapatista movement by reducing its influence and relevancy, the 
disproportionate amount of attacks against the Zapatistas revitalized pro-Zapatista 
protests, as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
                                                 




Figure 1.  Pro- and counter-Zapatista protests, 1994–2003.101  
The pattern of increased protests continues throughout the time of increased 
conflict from 1997-1999. With the disproportionate amount of force laying siege on the 
Zapatistas at the start of contention and from 1997-99, the Zapatistas were able to appeal 
to the international communities and garner a level of protections supported by aligning 
itself with international NGOs.  
The interaction of these movements emphasizes the need to expand political 
opportunities throughout the all levels of contention. Although domestic affiliates provide 
a substantial amount of top-cover, leverage, and a position for bargaining, the 
international level of contention can significantly disrupt a countermovement’s freedom 
of movement. The protections afforded to the Zapatistas by linking its organization with 
prominent international NGOs may have been avoided if the countermovement had 
identified more than the potential to broker support in the domestic arena. The 
countermovement never effectively appealed to the international community as the victim 
of a series of armed conflicts instigated by the Zapatistas. On the contrary, the 
countermovement took advantage of its domestic top-cover to conduct raids against 
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Zapatista sympathizers and fell into the same association as the state’s characterized 
response of unnecessary violence. The results of this lapse in judgment fed the Zapatistas 
counter, which was put into effect via a robust information war against the Mexican 
government and its affiliates.    
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
In terms of organizational structure, the counter-Zapatista movement established 
an efficient organizational structure that supported initial mobilization and the ability to 
sustain mobilization throughout the ebb and flow of contention. The resiliency of the 
counter-movement is evidenced in its ability to maintain activities despite the PRI’s 
electoral defeat in 2000. This resiliency was due to its ability to preserve its strong ties to 
the landowning elites and peasant organizations aligned with the PRI, such as the 
National Confederation of Peasants (Confederaci n Nacional Campesina or CNC .102  
Although the countermovement’s organizational infrastructure incorporated local 
communities linked with overarching political institutions and formal organizations, the 
countermovement made a critical error. The countermovement was not able to steal and 
integrate key brokers from the EZLN/Zapatista movement. Unfortunate for the 
countermovement, it was linked to PRI-affiliated paramilitary groups like Paz y Justicia 
(Peace and Justice) and Mascara Roja (Red Mask). The actions associated with Paz y 
Justicia and other paramilitary forces did more damage towards the desired effects of the 
countermovement than good. Paramilitary forces were the main perpetrators of numerous 
attacks like the one that resulted in 45 deaths of Zapatista sympathizers in the Acteal 
massacre.103 These type of attacks made it impossible for the countermovement to steal 
brokers from the targeted movement.  
In regards to the construction of a complex organizational structure, it is not only 
vital to build strong ties with the local communities and elites, but the countermovement 
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must filter out the individuals, groups, and/or organizations that can deter from 
appropriating oppositional and neutral brokers. This must be understood in the context of 
all levels of contention. The violent response may be acceptable or even invited at the 
domestic level, however this type of response may summon unwanted pressures from the 
international arena in the form of inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and NGOs. As 
was the case in this study, a massive amount of pressure from NGOs granted increased 
legitimacy and a certain amount of protections to the Zapatistas. In order to understand 
how the countermovement failed to successfully advertise its ideology, actions, and 
interests, I move to the next variable.  
D. COUNTER-NARRATIVE AND FRAMING PROCESS 
So how did the Zapatistas exploit its initial political leverage and why was it that 
the countermovement could not win the information war against the Zapatistas? I argue 
that the countermovement made little effort to combat the Zapatista movement’s 
narrative and failed to construct an effective framing process that detracted the 
mobilization of the Zapatista movement. Again the actions that continue to haunt the 
Mexican government are the ones that were conducted by the Mexican military in 1994, 
and the subsequent actions by violent local citizens and paramilitaries impaired any 
means to construct a counternetwar that could position the counter-Zapatista 
organizations as the victims of the conflict or the “good guy.”104 
The EZLN/Zapatista movement significantly changed the parameters of conflict 
in Mexico with the adaptation towards information operations. The movement’s 
information operations agitated the Mexican political system to the point that the 
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…the  apatista netwar…had profound effects, and not just in Mexico. It 
has shaken the foundations of the Mexican political system, by creating 
extraordinary pressure for democratic reforms and raising the specter of 
instability in America’s next-door neighbor…it is inspiring radical 
activists around the world to begin thinking that old models of struggle—
ones that call for building ‘parties’ and ‘fronts’ and ‘focos to crush the 
state’ and ‘seize power’—are not the way to go in the information age. A 
new concept…aims to draw on the power of ‘networks’ and strengthen 
global civil society in order to counterbalance state and market actors.106 
The EZLN also established an effective strategy that focused on the blunders 
carried out by the countermovement during the interplay of contention. In particular, 
EZLN focused on the violent responses exercised by the military and the local 
paramilitaries. In contrast to that of EZLN’s techniques, the Mexican government and its 
affiliated countermovement never developed any effective countermeasure to the EZLN’s 
strategy, which perpetuated the Zapatistas’ domination of the information campaign. 
Instead of constructing an elaborate motivational frame that centered on 
patriotism, nationalism, or freedom to entice domestic and international support. The 
Mexican government’s first move was that of violence. This was opposite of the United 
States’ response to terrorist attacks. George Bush and his advisors went to NATO for 
acceptance and support to before entering a conflict against a force that was less 
technologically advanced and equipped.107  
Whichever side understands the dynamics of the network first and more 
effectively will gain a major foothold in securing a prominent position in the cycle of 
contention.
108
 The Zapatista movement illustrates this statement clearly, as a small force 
of indigenous people were able to force reform on the Mexican political system as a 
result from pressures that was achieved by networking in order to achieve a greater 
relative amount of power.  
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E. FINDINGS 
To some up the findings related to this case study, I analyzed what conditions 
allowed for the Zapatista movement to establish a sustained movement that still exists 
today in Mexico. As this study has illustrated, conditions were present that could have 
presented the Zapatista movement as a VEM, however the opposite perspective emerged 
with the help of various international organizations. The dominance of the information 
campaign or framing process led to the Zapatistas acquirement of certain levels of 
protection. The Zapatistas’ campaign led towards the contention being viewed as an 
indigenous struggle against an oppressive PRI regime who controlled crony paramilitary 
forces to do its dirty work.  
The lessons learned from the interaction of these actors establishes the importance 
of developing a framing process or information campaign to engage a social movement in 
a netwar. Arquilla and Ronfeldt add that a skillful blend of government’s hierarchy with 
networks will aid in the process of creating a hybrid entity that is prepared to face new 
threats and challenges in the information age.
109
 Hierarchies alone, as represented by the 
Mexican government in this case, usually have a hard time in confronting networks.
110
 
Examples of this are evident in Colombia’s difficulties against drug cartels, Algeria’s 
continued contention with religious movements, and more recently the United States 
protracted conflict in Afghanistan.
111
 This is due to governments relying on age old 
solutions of force to take down networks, but it takes a network to bring down a 
network.
112
 Therein lies the reason for countermobilization. Unlike the aforementioned 
events associated with the Mexican government’s strategy, the government should rely 
on the countermovement’s organizational design and structure to take the “fight” to the 
targeted movement. Whether conducting a countermovement that focuses on non-
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violence, violence, or a healthy mix of the two, a framing process or a robust information 
campaign is needed to assist in the interpretation of events on all levels of contention. 
Moreover to the conclusion of this study, the execution of countermobilization 
should not only focus on interactions with the targeted movement, a framing strategy 
should be aimed at winning brokers from all levels of contention. Actions that are 
acceptable at one level of contention may be viewed as a deterrent in another level of 
contention. Therefore, the need to understand the full spectrum of contention, from local 
to international, is required. Every action leads to another action and those reactions can 
be interpreted differently at different levels. A fully developed framing or interpretive 
process should not rely on internal or external brokers to draw their own conclusions 
about key events. Their conclusions must be framed in a manner that portrays the 
countermovement as taken necessary means that are neither too overwhelming or can be 
perceived as being too lenient. As both of these conclusions have the potential to lead to a 
loss of credibility and subsequently a loss elites, brokers, and alliances. Further 
consideration must also be given to the individuals, groups, and organizations that are 
associated with the countermovement, as they have the potential to present vulnerabilities 
in establishing a credible portrayal of the countermovement. The key output in this study 
determines that an effective effort must be given towards the construction of a framing 
process, and a countermovement must avoid presenting the oppositional movement 
ammunition that gives a targeted movement any form of an advantage via vulnerabilities 
and blunders. However, if blunders or preexisting conditions are inevitable or 
unavoidable, measures must be taken to address these issues and a meanings must be 
interpreted for the local, national, and international communities to mitigate the extent of 
backlash from such actions or conditions. Therefore, the countermovement must focus on 
establishing a framing process that draws power from networks and interprets the 




IV. CASE STUDY 3: ISRAEL (HAMAS—PALESTINIAN 
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION) 
In the previous two cases, one illustrated the proper methods of developing a 
countermovement against a target movement, while the other demonstrated that a lack of 
attention to developing the essential factors associated with countermobilization increases 
the likelihood of failure. In this case study, I discuss the contention between Hamas and 
the PLO. This case study illustrates how the “Israeli-supported” countermovement 
achieved short-term success by greatly weakening the targeted movement within the 
PLO, but in the long-term failed to support Israeli interests due to the divergence of 
interests and ideology between sponsor and beneficiary. The basis of this study will 
examine the social and political competition between Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-
Islamiyya; Islamic resistance movement) and the PLO through the scope of 
countermobilization: expanding political opportunities, “complex” organizational 
structure, and the counter-narrative and framing process. Additionally, I examine the 
interactions between the sponsor and the countermovement and how the dynamics 
between the two actors affect outcomes. Hamas will serve as the countermovement 
against the existing nationalist movement of the PLO, which consisted predominantly of 
Yasser Arafat’s violent extremist organization known as Fatah.  
The analysis of this case sets forth conditions and/or actions that should be 
adopted or avoiding while conducting countermobilization and illustrate that even if a 
countermovement is conducted “properly,” the sponsor needs to exercise long-term 
control in order to prevent negative consequences. The third party sponsor in this case 
study is Israel, While Hamas was not directly constructed by Israel, the political 







it played more of a passive role in favor of Hamas. Israel shied away from Hamas’ early 





In the 1880s, the both state of Israel and the nation of Palestine did not exist. The 
area that would soon fuel tensions between Arabs and Israelis was comprised of two 
administrative districts of the Ottoman Empire, the Sanjak of Jerusalem and the Vilayet 
of Beirut.
114
 Much of the territory was under rule of landlords, and the other half was 
controlled under the mesha’a system, which loaned out land to individuals for a period of 
two to three years.
115
 
It was during the First World War (WWI) that the foundation for future conflicts 
was laid. In 1915, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, began 
to negotiate with the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, head of the Hashemite family, to discuss 
what Arabs believed to be important promises of their future independence in exchange 
for their services to the British against the Turks in WWI. These pledges contained a 
specific exclusion: 
The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the 
west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely 
Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded.
116
 
The Arabs believed that this referred to portions of what was soon to become 
Syria and Lebanon. However, the British claimed it was in reference to the land of 
Palestine, despite neither “Palestine” nor “Jerusalem” appearing in the documents.117  
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These differences soon intensified when the British were given mandated control of the 




Responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative, 
and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish 
national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-
governing institutions and also for safeguarding the civil and religious 
rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and 
religion.119 
This policy showed early signs of trouble as evidenced by the Arab riots in the 
1920s.
120
 These riots soon returned to a relative silence between the years of 1922 
through 1928 until violence broke out once again against Arabs and Jews at the Western 
Wall in Jerusalem. The context of the violence was over an increase in Jewish 
immigration and land purchases in the contested territory. Some in the British 
government recommended that only 20,000 more Jews would be allowed to migrate into 
Palestine, but this did not bode well for the Zionist community.
121
 The conflict eventually 
stabilized on its own until events in 1933 changed the Arab-Israeli conflict altogether. 
In 1933, Hitler became German Chancellor and subsequently secured his position 
as dictator of the Third Reich. Under Hitler’s rule, Nazi Germany conducted a massive 
assault against the Jewish people, killing millions in the Holocaust. The Jewish people 
began to emigrate from Europe in massive numbers in an attempt to escape violent anti-
Semitism, but there was nowhere to turn to except Palestine. Events eventually led up to 
the United Nations Partition of Palestine on November 29, 1947, which almost 
simultaneously sparked a new level of violence in the Holy Land. Since the partition of 
Palestine there has been constant violence marked by a series of major conflicts: Israeli 
War of Independence (1948-49), Suez-Sinai Campaign (1956), Six-Day War (1967), The 
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War of Attrition (1967–1970), Yom Kippur War (1973), First Lebanon War (1982–
1985), First Intifada (1988–1992), Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000–2005), and the Second 
Lebanon War (2006). 
The results of the early wars were extremely disheartening for the Arab people, in 
particular the Palestinians. However, from under these disheartening conditions emerged 
a Palestinian revival, which saw the rise of leaders and organizations like Yasser Arafat, 
Fatah, and the PLO.
122
 Despite Arafat’s early attempts at inciting violence that concluded 
with some 200 guerrillas killed and 1000 arrested in the winter of 1967-68, his actions 
sealed him as a leader among the Palestinians. Yasser Arafat’s Fatah organization also 
increased its influence and prestige among the Palestinians.
123
 This was evidenced in the 
PLO’s reorganization in the summer of 1968, which revised the 1964 National Charter to 
reflect Fatah’s leadership and strategy of armed resistance and insurgent tactics.124 
The events of the 1973 Yom Kippur War also boosted the general Arab 
population and their pride, however the Palestinians had a different take on the results of 
the war. Although the Yom Kippur war seemingly restored Arab pride and the revealed 
the Gulf States’ leverage over western economies via the “oil weapon,” the Palestinians 
realized that Sadat did not fight the war on Palestinian’s behalf. The Palestinians viewed 
the events of the war as an attempt for Sadat to produce a settlement with Israel, which 
would leave Israel invulnerable to future attacks.
125
 The results of the 1973 war also led 
to the realization that the state of Israel was not leaving, much to the dismay of the 
Palestinians. However, this realization led to a change in strategy for the PLO. The 
Twelfth Palestine National Council in July 1974 adopted a formula that allowed 
Palestinians to establish a “mini state” solution that represented the base from which 
future liberation of the entire Palestine could be achieved.
126
 The formation of the “mini 
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state” solution led to the Arab states’ acceptance of the PLO as a government in exile. 
The acceptance was validated with the results of the Arab Summit at Rabat in Morocco 
on 28 October 1974.127 Soon, Arafat would find himself conducting speeches and 
presenting the Palestinians’ grievances in front of the UN Assembly.  
Despite the PLO’s attempts at developing a Palestinian state, the results were only 
more peace talks and negotiations. The Palestinians watched and saw as the Camp David 
Summit, under Pres. Carter, and Pres. Reagan’s Peace plan failed to not only establish a 
Palestinian state, but it also failed to effectively restrain Israel from expanding its borders 
and settlements. Soon tensions would grow to the point that the First Intifada between 
Palestinians and Israel would come into existence. The First Intifada was particularly 
important, because it demonstrated the PLO’s growing influence among the Palestinians. 
The newer generation of Palestinians looked towards the PLO rather than towards Jordan 
for leadership and rule. This was a result of PLO’s bottom-up approach towards building 
its organization from within community groups, cultural associations, women 
organizations, etc. In essence the First Intifada displayed the new movement of 
Palestinians that not only wanted to govern themselves, but did not fear Israel to achieve 
their aspirations.
128
 The First Intifada also brought drawbacks for the PLO. Before the 
First Intifada, the PLO was the sole representative for the Palestinian struggle against 
Israel, however this changed with the emergence of Hamas. Hamas was established as a 
branch from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that was founded specifically to participate in 
the armed struggle against Israel in an effort to expel all Israelis from the former-British 
Mandatory Palestine (West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel) and to establish an Islamist state 
in its place.
129
 Soon Hamas and the PLO were in contention for the support of the 
Palestinian as the primary representative for the struggle. 
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In an attempt to bring the Intifada to a close, PLO leadership and American 
diplomats conducted discussions, which led to the PLO’s declaration of an independent 
Palestine on the West Bank and Gaza. This was significant, because it also meant that the 
PLO recognized the state of Israel, which brought discontent among sections of 
Palestinians who wanted all of Palestine or nothing. Groups like Hamas saw the 
negotiations between the PLO, Israel, and the United States as an opportunity to gain 
influence among the new generation of Palestinians. 
B. EXPANDING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY 
From this point, I examine the conditions and action taken by both parties that 
split the Palestinian resistance into two primary factions: the Fatah-supported West Bank, 
which continue to hold the presidency with Mahmoud Abbas, and the Hamas-supported 
Gaza Strip, which controls the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). In particular, this 
section analysis how Hamas managed the ebb and flow of contention and capitalized on 
advantageous shifts to garner political support in order to mobilize an effective 
countermovement. 
As discussed in Chapter I, shifts within the socio-economic processes gives rise to 
political opportunities. In this case, there are a number of factors that allowed Hamas to 
take advantage of the socio-economic process and expand its political opportunity, but 
there were also times that Hamas could have lost its identity and overall struggle during 
the cycle of contention. First, as tensions and armed clashes increased Hamas was able to 
find legitimacy in its claim for a defensive jihad as Israel’s retaliatory strikes and raids 
against Palestinians were viewed as disproportionate against the Palestinian’s 
composition for resistance, and as evidenced with the First and Second (Al Aqsa) 
Intifada, Hams increased its attacks to garner more support and popularity, which enticed 
Israel to continue assaults against the Palestinian people. 
Between February 1989 and March 2000 Hamas carried out at least 
twenty-seven attack, including twelve suicide bombings and three failed 
bombings. These attacks caused approximately 185 deaths and left over 
1,200 people wounded. 
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…From September 29, 2000, through March 24, 2004, Hamas executed 52 
suicide attacks, killing 288 people and wounding 1,646 more. In total 
Hamas conducted 425 terrorist attacks during this period, killing 377 
people and wounding 2,076. 
Hamas attacks increased throughout this period. In 2003 alone, Hamas 
was responsible for 218 acts of violence. That figure more than doubled in 
2004, in which Hamas carried out 555 terrorist attacks. Also in 2004 
Hamas mortar attacks increased 500 percent and its Qassam rocket attacks 
increased by 40 percent compared to the previous year.130 
Although the years of the Intifadas were “kind” to Hamas in terms of gaining 
popularity and support,131 the years following the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993, which 
ended the First Intifada, represented a major threat to Hamas as an organization. Since 
Hamas was founded on the ideals of defensive jihad, a peace agreement would hurt the 
legitimacy of Hamas.132 Moreover, the peace process swung in favor towards the PLO, 
since at the time of the negotiations Palestinian popular opinion was in favor of the peace 
process, which was being conducted by the PLO.133 However, Hamas adapted to the 
conditions at hand and conducted a strategy of limited violence against Israel. First, 
Hamas declared the Oslo negotiations were a farce and not an attempt for peace, but an 
attempt to prolong oppression against the Palestinians.134 Second, Hamas capitalized on 
events like the Hebron massacre to allow for continued defensive jihad, which would 
entice an Israeli response and keep the cycle of violence alive.  
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Hamas’ slump during the Oslo peace process soon came to an end, when the Oslo 
accords reached a stalemate and the Al Aqsa Intifada followed. Hamas’ opposition to the 
peace process soon paid off as public opinion swayed against the PLO and the peace 
process. Many Palestinians viewed the Oslo accords essentially as a plan on how to 
conduct future talks rather than a plan that would suffice Palestinian aspirations for 
statehood.
135 
The Oslo accords stated: 
The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations [is]…to establish a 
Palestinian Self-Government Authority…for a transitional period not 
exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338…Permanent status negotiations will 
commence…not later than the beginning of the third year…and will cover 
remaining issues including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security 
arrangements, border, relations and cooperation with other neighbors.136 
This act was one of the main occurrences that presented Hamas with the 
opportunity to strike a wedge between the Palestinian people and the PLO. The Oslo 
agreements represented the terms of defeat by the Palestinians.
137
 These agreements 
would also ensure that the hardships on the Palestinian people would not only continue 
but become worse. The Oslo accords allowed for the activities that would lead to more 
severe economic deprivation and restrictions on Palestinian movement while more land 




This agreement [i.e., the DOP], which permits the Palestinians to run their 
affairs, safeguards the following issues for Israel: Unified Jerusalem 
remains under Israel’s rule, and the body that will run the lives of the 
Palestinians in the territories will have no authority over it…There are no 
differences of opinion in this House over the eternalness of Jerusalem as 
Israel’s capital. United and unified Jerusalem is not negotiable….The 
Israeli settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will remain under Israel’s 
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rule without any change whatsoever in their status….The IDF will 
continue to bear overall responsibility for the security of the Israeli staying 
in the territories, and for the external security—namely for the defense of 
the current confrontation lines along the Jordan River and for the Egyptian 
border….The Israeli government’s freedom to determine its positions [on 
all final status issues is preserved by the DOP] leaving all the options 
open….The might of the IDF—the best army in the world—is available 
for our use if, God forbid, we are faced with such challenge [from the 
Palestinians]…. Above all, I want to tell you that this is a great victory for 
Zionism.139  
These conditions dramatically worsened near the end of the al-Aqsa Intifada when 
the PLO also accepted Israel as a formal state within its 1967 boundaries in an attempt to 




While Israel achieved desired ends through the accords, Israeli restrictions on the 
freedom of movement in regards to people and goods during the post-Oslo era gravely 
affected the Palestinian economy. By the end of 2003, 31 percent of the Palestinian labor 
force was unemployed. According to the World Bank report, the Israeli checkpoints, 
military raids, and frequent closure of routes, which were supported by the Oslo accords, 
were some of the main reasons the economy of the Palestinians were suffering despite 
receiving over $1 billion dollars in international aid since 2002.
141
 As discussed, the Oslo 
accords failed to establish Palestinian statehood and only allowed the formation of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), an interim Palestinian self-ruled government, which was far 
from the desired end for Palestinians and viewed as another failure of the PLO to acquire 
a definite means towards statehood. In fact, some scholars have compared the 
establishment of the PA with the establishment of the Bantusans by the South African in 
the 1959 apartheid process. The apartheid law established rule to the Bantu people in the 
form of Bantusans, which institutionalized segregation (apartheid) between whites and 
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blacks as the Oslo accords have done for Palestinians and Israelis.
142
 Moreover, permits 
and passes for movement throughout the region were established as an apartheid tactic as 
well.
143
 The combination of the poor economic condition, the failed Oslo process, and the 
acceptance of an Israeli state while a Palestinian statehood was nowhere in sight 
weakened the domestic support for the ruling PLO and created the conditions for Hamas 
to expand its political opportunity in a bid for hegemon of the Palestinian movement and 
strengthen its influence over the Palestinian people. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
It was not only the shift of political opportunities that allowed for Hamas to 
compete with the PLO as a representative body of Palestinians in years to come. If it 
were not for Hamas’ establishment of a “complex” organizational structure, the 
countermovement would not have had the capacity to compete with the PLO’s 
domination of institutional infrastructure or take advantage of the shift. It was evident 
during the First Intifada that the PLO had institutional dominance of occupied Palestine. 
The PLO had the ability to work through local activist and mobilize the masses for 
violent and non-violent purposes with relative ease.
144
 Therefore, Hamas needed a 
composition to counter the organizational strength of the PLO.  
Hamas’ organization can be analyzed in three layers: formal hierarchical 
organization, organization of collective action, and informal connective structures. The 
formal hierarchal organizational structure of Hamas was designed and constructed by its 
leader Sheik Yassin. Hamas was characterized vertically by a hierarchical chain of 
command controlled by commanders, sub-commanders, and fixed numbers and positions. 
Horizontally, Hamas assigned various tasks to specific groups within its organization 
based upon functions performed for the organization. The bureaucratic hierarchy 
included four separate groups that included some of the collective action groups: internal 
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security, military activities, political activities, and Islamic preaching (da’wa).145 Sheik 
Yassin was heavily influenced by the MB. Hamas’ origins are deeply rooted in the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement, which founded Palestinian institutions like the Islamic 
Center (al-Mujamma’ al-islami) that played crucial roles in Hamas’ future development 
of the social infrastructure. Mujamma became the focal point for religious and social 
education and development when Sheik Yassin created Hamas.
146
 This organizational 
foundation in MB not only gave Hamas access to the leadership and resource pool of the 
Mujamma, it also tied it to multiple other institutions that MB had ties and control of like 
the Islamic University in Gaza, the Department of Islamic Endowments (Da’irat al-awqaf 
al-islamiyya), the Islamic Workers Union and other voluntary and public institutions.
147
  
Hamas also used the role of the da’wa in order to establish control of the public 
by means of social mobilization and religion. The da’wa activities were concentrated 
around the mosques and incorporated religion education, sports, and social activities as 
means for recruitment and training.
148
 This practice facilitated in Hamas growing from 
within the social connective tissues of the Palestinians. This practice also saved the 
organization during the Intifada when Hamas’ formal hierarchical organization was 
severely damaged as key leaders and sub-commanders were targeted and killed 
throughout the conflict. Despite Israel’s intelligence success on deciphering codes, 
gathering and identifying key information, and targeting key Hamas figures, the 
organization survived obstacles and reprisal with the help from the younger grass-roots 
community who risked their lives to keep the movement strong for the cause. 
When the political opportunity presented itself, Hamas was well-suited and 
networked into the Palestinian infrastructure than the PLO. With its organizational 
structure it not only had the will and capacity to continue the pursuit for national 
liberation, it was better equipped to respond to the socio-economic problems of the 
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Palestinian people. In regards to military strength and capabilities, organizations like the 
al-Aqsa Martyrs were able to match the activities of Hamas, but few of them could 
compete with the social services of Hamas, which remains one of the principal deciding 
factors in retaining domestic support of the Palestinians over the PLO.
149
 
D. COUNTER-NARRATIVE AND FRAMING PROCESS 
At the time of Hamas’ inception, the PLO was the leading organization in 
mobilizing Palestinians towards statehood, but Hamas emerged as the Islamic alternative 
to the PLO. Hamas countered the PLO’s mission of secular nationalism in return for a 




The Islamic theme presented by Hamas was not a new ideology. It was part of a 
growing movement in the Middle East that called for a return to Islam. This renewed 
sense to return to Islam resulted from the Arab defeat in the 1967 conflict, the failure of 
Arab states to achieve social and economic progress in terms of the socio-economic gap, 
and the fear of the West’s expansion of its modern -secular culture.151 These conditions 
allowed the religious sect to place blame for their recent conditions on the widening 
division of Arab culture from Allah (Islamic name for God). These conditions also 
supported the call for Arabs to return to the foundations of Islam, so that they could avoid 
jahiliyya (non-Islamic rule characterized by ignorance) in exchange for the perfect rule of 
Allah. 
The Islamic nationalist approach was not the only selling point for Hamas. Hamas 
initially portrayed itself as a non-violent nationalist socio-religious movement. Therefore, 
in addition to Islamic and nationalist approaches, Hamas engrained itself into the social 
infrastructure as it maintained support for the community through funding “veritable 
networks of welfare and charitable services (such as schools, orphanages, soup 
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kitchens).”152 These actions not only provided the needs of the community, but it gave 
Hamas the advantage of augmenting its narrative with humanitarian and social welfare 
ideals, which drew people towards the religious leaders of Hamas.
153
 This aspect of the 
narrative was not only able to influence the impoverished people of Palestine, it also 
gained the group international recognition and support, which predominantly came from 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
154
 This guise as a non-violent movement also fashioned passive 
Israeli support towards Hamas, which led to Israel’s decision to not interfere with Hamas’ 
financial operations and organizational activities that enabled it to gain a foundation into 
the Palestinian social infrastructure. Even when Hamas finally showed its true face to the 
world as a VEM, Hamas continued use of controlled violence in perspective towards the 
PLO, which gave Hamas time to expand its ranks and consolidate its power.
155
  
…Hamas maintained a policy of controlled violence against Israel while 
demonstrating a moderate attitude toward the Palestinian self-governing 
authority. Thus, although Hamas’s [sic] top leadership refused to meet 
with Arafat and Abu Mazin because of their part in signing the DOP, it did 
issue instructions prohibiting infighting and maintaining open channels 
with Fatah.156 
Hamas’ approach to a negotiated coexistence with the PLO during the years of the 
Intifada, when the PLO was the dominant movement, was necessary to ensure survival of 
the movement.
157
 The leadership of Hamas knew that the political shift that would give 
the movement momentum was not in full tilt. While Hamas displayed a savvy 
understanding of the political environment with its emphasis on an all-Islamic approach, 
it also understood that an all-or-nothing approach would lead to a full confrontation 
between Israel, the PLO and the PA. Hamas would therefore take a pragmatic approach 
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as it neither fully accepted nor rejected the Oslo accords, which allowed it to continue its 
religious armed struggle against Israel without the loss of its socio-political basis.
158
 This 
move supported a “long-term” vision towards achieving popular support, which would 
eventually come into fruition in 2006. 
Hamas’ narrative was extremely successful, because it was inclusive enough to 
draw support from multiple audiences. It incorporated an Islamic premise to its 
nationalist approach in order to not only draw support from the Palestinians that wanted 
statehood, but also took advantage of the “return to Islam” movement to entice the 
religious sect. Moreover, Hamas added non-violent humanitarian tones to invoke the 
support of the Palestinians that wanted socio-economic reforms and the support of 
international actors that saw Hamas as a more legitimate alternative to support the 
Palestinians. As is evident with Hamas, the advantages of a wide-ranging narrative allows 
for greater access to different communities, and therefore access into more institutions, 
leaders, and financial support. Hamas’ narrative initially gave it legitimacy as a 
movement characterized by religious, social, and nationalist desires. It was not until later 
that Hamas unveiled its true intensions, which were for the outset of Israel from Palestine 
by any means necessary to include violence, however by the time this narrative was 
realized Hamas was already a movement deeply rooted and staged for political and 
military engagements. 
E. ISRAEL AND HAMAS 
Although, Hamas accomplished a portion of what Israel wanted in developing an 
oppositional force against the PLO. Israel made a miscalculation much like the United 
States did in Iran during the 1970s with the encouragement of Islamist groups should the 
Shah lose power.
159
 However, the Shah did lose power and radical Islam expanded its 
anti-Western influence throughout Iran. 
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For years prior to Hamas’ turn towards violence, Israel tolerated and, in some 
cases, emboldened Hamas to serve as a counterweight against the Fatah and the PLO.
160
 
Israel cooperated with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, because it viewed Hamas’ precursor, 
Mujama, as a charity organization, so Israel looked the other way when Mujama 
members established the foundation of its organizations into the Islamic University of 
Gaza, mosques, clubs and schools. Israel also allowed the secular PLO and the Islamists 
to battle for influence throughout the Gaza and the West Bank.
161
 These actions later 
came to haunt Israel as the aforementioned organization soon became the focal point of 
violence, and Hamas grew emboldened from its interactions with the PLO.  
So what went wrong? The problem was that Israel never had any real control of 
the anti-PLO countermovement. Israel merely just any organization that opposed the PLO 
to rise up without infiltrating deep enough into the organization to realize its core 
purpose, which was to rid Israel from the land of Palestine in substitute for an Islamic 
state. By now embedding itself into the organization, Israel could neither realize the 
extent of the core ideology nor frame its direction that would allow for a safer and more 
secure Israel. In contrast, Israel inherited an organization that endorsed massive suicide 
bombings and rockets aimed at the heart of Israel. 
F. FINDINGS 
In terms of a counter-movement, Hamas emerged from ideal conditions that 
favored an alternative movement. Hamas waited for the right opportunity to take 
advantage of the ebb and flow of the socio-political environment, it developed a 
“complex” organizational structure consisting of formal hierarchical organizations to 
informal connective structures, and developed a counter-narrative that focused on 
attacking a preexisting vulnerability associated with the PLO. In 2006, Hamas won 74 of 
the legislative council’s 132 seats to become the new dominant force in the Palestinian 
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 Hamas’ rise to power over the PLO was what Israel wanted to happen in 
order to weaken the PLO’s influence over the Palestinian people. However Israel did not 
foresee Hamas’ inevitable transition to a violent extremist movement that would be more 
militant than its predecessor.  
Therefore in terms of countermobilization, this case study shows that even if a 
counter movement is organized and maintained properly, if the benefactor/sponsor of a 
countermovement does not have control or influence of the countermovement’s aims 
there is a potential that the countermovement can become a more dangerous opponent in 
the end. 
The selection of a sponsored countermovement should not be solely based on the 
concept of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The United States also makes this 
mistake in supporting a movement that is eventually considered a global-oriented VEM. 
(i.e., U.S. sponsorship of Afghan resistance groups against the Soviet Union in the 70s, 
etc.) Israel saw an opportunity to weaken its perceived greater enemy, the PLO, but failed 
to identify the potential threat of allowing Hamas to grow. Israel had no control of the 
framing process or direct influence within the informal connective structures of Hamas, 
and both Hamas and the PLO’s oppositional foundation was counter to Israeli interests, 
which was suited neither for direct nor indirect support as a means to an end. 
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V. COUNTERMOBILIZATION AND THE AL-QA’IDA VIOLENT 
EXTREMIST MOVEMENT  
There is a growing importance in transnational networking and mobilization that 
is emerging more rapidly as technologies like the Internet are used to communicate 
beliefs and ideals globally in an instance. This is evident with the case study pertaining to 
the Zapatista movement as well as recent “awakening” events in Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Syria. This global reach of ideals implies the existence of a “global civil society” that has 
the potential to represent its own social norms and influence state behaviors. With this 
being said, any actor whether state or non-state has the potential to influence the “global 
civil society” through transnational contention of beliefs, culture, and ideals.163 The claim 
of potential influence is supported by violent extremist movements like Al-Qa’ida, which 
have achieved reach and reputation on a global scale. The ideology of Al-Qa’ida 
penetrates state and continental boundaries, yet the organization does not have a formal 
state to call home. This intriguing dynamic illustrates the power that social movements 
and contentious politics have and the potential that I preset that could threaten, influence, 
or transform the status quo of a society. The consequences of disregarding this political 
phenomenon proves to be detrimental towards the stability and survivability of regimes, 
and strategies should be analyzed to determine viable ways of countering this threat. 
I began this thesis by outlining distinct objectives that were to underlie the 
analysis of countermobilization. In this chapter, I return to those objectives and present a 
synthesis of theory and empirical analysis contained in the previous chapters. I present 
my findings into modifications that utilize the theory of countermobilization to frame a 
desired strategy to be used within the cycle of contention against Al-Qa’ida. 
The objective of this chapter is two-fold. First, it is to discuss how Al-Qa’ida 
emerged as a transnational VEM able to contend with nation-states’ powers and 
influence. In this chapter, I also analyze the variable factors that facilitate the existence of 
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Al-Qa’ida in terms of the political process model: the socio-economic process, the 
expanding political opportunities that were created, its indigenous organizational 
approach and subsequent transformation, and the narrative/ framing process it uses to 
recruit, motivate and employ its forces. Second, I will present a model to counter the Al-
Qa’ida threat. The proposed countermobilization model entails the use of an 
unconventional warfare team that synchronizes multiple local networks in order to 
establish a countermovement that opposes Al-Qa’ida. The purpose of the proposed model 
is established as a strategy to neutralize Al-Qa’ida and its ideology. The following model 
includes elements that can be identified, organized, and influenced through the scope of 
countermobilization as this concept is tailored to express the employment of the model 
towards a targeted movement. 
A. AL-QA’IDA AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL 
Al-Qa’ida is a global movement with the ability to mobilize and sustain a global 
conflict against the mightiest of states in an attempt to achieve the social and political 
objectives of the movement. Al-Qa’ida’s uncanny ability to grow and survive as a 
transnational phenomenon is not because counter-terrorist units and law enforcement 
agencies fail to react effectively against the organization.
164
 Al-Qa’ida’s strength is a 
result of its broad-based ideology, innovative structure, and capacity to take advantage of 
political opportunities across ethnic, class, and national borders.
165
 In order to fully 
understand the mechanisms behind the emergence of Al-Qa’ida, we must first look at the 
socio-economic process that shaped the environment that allowed an organization like 
Al-Qa’ida to emerge. 
Al-Qa’ida’s leaders firmly aligned their ideals with the teachings of Muslim 
Brotherhood founder Hasan al-Banna. Al-Banna believed that the root of decay in the 
Muslim world was because of Western ideals. He sought for a return to the “pure” Islam 
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of the Prophet Mohammed’s times,166 and although al-Banna was assassinated in 1949 by 
the Egyptian government, his ideals lived on through successive reformers like Al 
Shaheed Sayyid Qutb and Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf’Azzam. This perception of a 
deteriorating Muslim world flourished even more after the Muslim community was 
embarrassed at the results of a series of Arab-Israeli wars, most notably in 1948-1949, 
1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982, and this perception also gave rise to a need for change. A 
change through which some called for a “defensive jihad.” 
According to Sheikh Azzam, who was a heavy influence of Osama bin Laden, the 
source of Muslims’ misfortune is due to the abandonment of jihad for the love of this 
world and the things in it.
167
 His teachings stressed the importance, need, and obligatory 




When the enemy enters that land of the Muslims, jihad becomes 
individually obligatory, according to all the jurists, mufassirin and 
muhaddithin…When jihad becomes obligatory, no permission of parents 
is required… Donating money does not exempt a person from bodily 
jihad, no matter how great the amount of money given… jihad is the 
obligation of a lifetime…Jihad is currently individually obligatory, in 
person and by wealth, in every place that the disbelievers have occupied. It 
remains obligatory continuously until every piece of land that was once 
Islamic is regained…Jihad is a collective act of worship, and every group 
must have a leader. Obedience to the leader is a necessity in jihad, and 
thus a person must condition himself invariably to obey the leader, as has 
been reported in the hadith: “You must hear and obey, whether it is easy 
or difficult for you, in things which are pleasant for you as well as those 
which are inconvenient and difficult for you.169 
Al-Qa’ida tied its ideology firmly within this concept of defensive jihad in order 
to legitimize the organization’s campaign. Osama bin Laden used the ideology of this 
obligatory form of jihad in order to attract the broadest support possible and subsequently 
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expand the organization’s political opportunities. The consequences of refusing to 
conduct jihad is written to be promised by Allah: “Unless you march forth, he will punish 
you with severe punishment, and will replace you with another people.”170 As the call for 
jihad amassed more supporters, Osama bin Laden also used anti-Western, anti-American, 
and anti-Israeli rhetoric to even further ensure that his support base would reach global 
proportions and resiliency. In a 1996 edict issued by Osama bin Laden he uses his disdain 
for the United States to raise awareness of Muslim grievances and calls for jihad: 
It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam have suffered 
from aggression, iniquity and injustices imposed upon them by the 
Zionist-Crusader alliance and their collaborators to the extent that the 
Muslims’ blood has become the cheapest in the eyes of the ‘world,’ and 
their wealth has become as loot, in the hands of their enemies. Their blood 
was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the massacre 
of Qana, Lebanon, are still fresh in our memories. Massacres in Tajikistan, 
Burma, Kashmir, Assam, the Philippines, Fatani, Ogaden, Somalia, 
Eritrea, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have taken place, massacres 
that sent shivers through the body, and shake the conscience.  
All of this—and the world watched and heard, and not only did they not 
respond to the atrocities, but also, under a clear conspiracy—between the 
USA and its allies, under the cover of the iniquitous ‘United Nations’—
dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend 
themselves. The people of Islam awakened, and realized that they were the 
main target for the aggression of the Zionist-Crusader alliance. And all the 
false claims and propaganda about ‘human rights’ were hammered down 
and exposed for what they were, by the massacres that had taken place 
against the Muslims in every part of the world.171 
Although Osama bin Laden was not a religious scholar, he had a pragmatic mind-
set, which allowed him to avoid pitfalls of past “Islamic” struggles. In the framing 
process of Al-Qa’ida’s narrative, he developed a pragmatic approach that promoted the 
establishment of the umma (community of believers) rather than the concept of 
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 This concept divested the notion of a mono-ethnic movement and ensured 
that all Muslims whether newly converted, Asian, or Arab had a place in Al-Qa’ida. Thus 
it is the religious and open culture (Middle Eastern or non-Middle Eastern as long as they 
are believers) nature of Al-Qa’ida that appeals to a wide-based support that spans culture, 
borders, or objectives in which to build a robust organizational infrastructure.
173 
 
Because of Al-Qa’ida’s appeal to certain sects of Muslims across the globe, it has 
the ability to pursue its objectives through a decentralized network structured from 
regionally-structured cells.
174
 These cells are made up of affiliated organizations, 
guerrilla groups, and even international non-governmental organizations. Rather than 
build an organization from scratch in each region, an essential part of Al-Qa’ida’s success 
and resiliency is its support system based of affiliated local networks that were infiltrated 
by the organization. Many of these organizations are banks or charity-based organizations 
like Benevolence International Foundation and Global Relief Foundation that may not 
have direct ties to Al-Qa’ida, but these organizations allow Al-Qa’ida to funnel money in 
support of operational activities.
175
 Al-Qa’ida also imbedded a vanguard of “graduates” 
into Islamic groups and communities worldwide in order to spread their violent extremist 
beliefs.
176
 These vanguards were considered the religious zealots of Al-Qa’ida and were 
specifically trained and indoctrinated to plant seeds of Al-Qa’ida’s beliefs throughout 
different countries and cultures. These vanguard groups would install themselves into 
mosques, schools, clubs, and organizations and slowly indoctrinate the community with 
Al-Qa’ida’s message. As a result, the neutralization of Al-Qa’ida’s central command has 
done little in stopping the spread of violence or its ability to attract Muslims, because the 
ideology of Al-Qa’ida has already multiplied and morphed into an entity that can live and  
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continue to proliferate on its own. Even with Osama bin Laden dead Al-Qa’ida exists, 
and if Zawahiri were killed tomorrow Al-Qa’ida would still exist, because it lives within 
the informal connective tissues of local societies. 
Therefore the way to defeat Al-Qa’ida is not by solely relying on the targeting and 
killing of every cell member in the world. This militaristic approach has rarely led to the 
termination of a VEM.
177
 Since the ideology of Al-Qa’ida has become a virtual living 
entity that can currently survive with or without a leader to push an agenda, the ideology 
must be targeted, which bullets, bombs, and drones cannot do. A broader-based strategy 
to defeat Al-Qa’ida must be constructed,178 which I argue is by establishing a 
countermovement aimed at one or more vulnerabilities within the building blocks of a 
social movement: socio-economic environment, organization, narrative, and political 
opportunities. 
From these building blocks, the most vulnerable is not Al-Qa’ida’s organization. 
Al-Qa’ida’s vulnerability lies within its ideology. For more than a decade, coalition 
forces spearheaded by the United States have tried to neutralize Al-Qa’ida by disrupting 
its financial networks, denying it safe-havens, and killing central leaders, but the 
organization continues to grow despite these actions. Although Al-Qa’ida-Central has 
lost the majority of its control of the organization, the movement lives on. That is because 
we are treating Al-Qa’ida as an army fighting against us in the “War on Terrorism,” 
rather than as a movement that is engrained into the hearts and minds of a particular 
fraction of the “global civil society.”  
B. COUNTER-MOBILIZATION AND AL-QA’IDA 
The development of a countermovement that focuses on defeating Al-Qa’ida from 
all levels of contention is the means to engage Al-Qa’ida and its ideology. As stated 
above, the United States cannot solely rely on attacking the organizational structure of 
Al-Qa’ida. The United States must construct a means to counter Al-Qa’ida’s narrative 
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and framing process. This can be achieved through the incorporative mix of UW into the 
countermovement process. The days of solely viewing UW as Special Forces soldiers 
garbed in camouflage operating in the jungle with guerrilla chiefs and fighters armed to 
the teeth is fading. In this concept of countermobilization, a consolidated UW effort is 
established by UW teams armed predominantly with cultural/social knowledge of a 
targeted region and a strong narrative related to their respective region. With these 
instruments at their disposal, a myriad of UW teams dispersed throughout the global 
theater can create a robust countermovement that is capable of countering Al-Qa’ida’s 
ideology. 
Currently, the ebb and flow of contention is ripe for the development of a 
countermovement against Al-Qa’ida. Although, there is no need to try and change the 
process or the environment, the effort must be made to use the existing environment as 
part of the framing process within the counter-narrative. Using a diagnostic frame, part of 
the framing process should highlight that the Muslim world is still in disarray despite the 
spread of Al-Qa’ida’s message. This is supported by Shi’ite and Sunnis battling in Iraq, 
Syria’s continued civil war, the Palestinian’s lack of a state, and Palestinian’s continued 
impoverished conditions. Muslim nations are looking for answers and are growing weary 
of corrupt regimes as well as violent extremism, which is why we have seen regime 
changes in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, etc. Now is the time to capitalize on favorable 
conditions to expand political opportunities that present themselves.  
At each location a UW team is operational, there will exist different local 
conditions that will require interpreting and predicting to ensure the right time and 
conditions are established for a countermovement to emerge. However, if the domestic 
arena continues to operate in unfavorable conditions for an extended amount of time, 
actions must be taken to influence conditions that are advantageous to the 
countermovement. Additionally, a countermovement can engage international 
organizations and institutions in an attempt to limit whatever local obstacles are a 




around the globe under a strong counter-narrative supported by a swarming framing 
process and a robust organizational structure that encompasses multiple aspects of 
political opportunities.  
A good place to begin developing a narrative is by looking at the counter to Al-
Qa’ida’s narrative of a holy war. Jihad is used in several different contexts. These include 
love of the Creator, staying on the righteous path, resisting temptation, conducting 
religious acts of kindness, courage to convey the message of Islam, defending Islam and 
the community, helping allied people who may not be Muslim, removing apostate 
regimes, freeing people from tyranny, etc.
179
 Jihad can be viewed as an external violent 
struggle as adopted by violent extremist movements like Al-Qa’ida or an internal war 
between one’s self and the temptations of the devil and earthly desires.  
In developing a counter-narrative, it is essential to generate a motivational frame 
that highlights the validity of the countermovement’s interpretation over Al-Qa’ida’s 
misinterpretation of the word jihad. If the basis of Al-Qa’ida’s ideology is discredited, 
than the populace, to include oppositional brokers, have the potential to believe that the 
idea of internal jihad is the true jihad. The motivational frame should also focus on the 
legitimacy of Al-Qa’ida’s interpretation of jihad by how it conducts jihad. It is no secret 
that Al-Qa’ida supports the use of terrorism as a means to an end. Osama bin Laden and 
his lieutenants orchestrated the 9/11 attacks against the United States and many other 
attacks against U.S. embassies and personnel. Terrorism, which requires the deliberate 
targeting and killing of innocent civilians, is forbidden in the Qur’an, and even a religious 
scholar quoted many times by Bin Laden states: 
As for those who cannot offer resistance or cannot fight, such as women, 
children, monks, old people, the blind, handicapped and their like shall not 
be killed, unless they actually fight with words [e.g., by propaganda] and 
acts [e.g., by spying or otherwise assisting in warfare]. Some [jurists] are 
of the opinion that all of them may be killed on the mere ground that they 
are unbelievers, but they make an exception for women and children since  
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for Muslims they constitute property. However, the first opinion is the 
correct one, because we may only fight those who fight us when we want 
to make the religion of Allah victorious.180 
Finally, the framing process should highlight the perception that the current 
deteriorating Muslim world is in chaos, because the Muslim people have further alienated 
themselves from the true meaning of Islamic teachings as presented by the Prophet 
Mohammed in the name of Allah. A frame should denote that jihadists have forsaken the 
true meaning of jihad and transformed Islamic teachings for personal gain. A need to 
return to the true meaning of jihad, the internal conflict of righteousness, will create more 
resolute and faithful Muslims and subsequently a more righteous Muslim world. Only 
then can Allah truly bless the Muslim nation. 
Additionally, UW teams must ensure that the framing process is tailored to each 
specific region and local community. Moreover, the message should be disseminated 
utilizing a complex organizational structure mixed with non-governmental organizations, 
communities, and groups. Since sacred authority is an essential part of the Muslim world, 
an organizational infrastructure must be constructed that centers around the religious 
institutions like the mosques and madrasas. It is also understood that groups like 
“moderate” Muslims and reformist salafis outnumber the jihadi nation, but what is 
lacking is organization. This is where the UW teams become vital. It is essential that UW 
teams are embedded into social structures of targeted regions in order to truly grasp the 
social interworking of a region. With the knowledge provided by social understanding, a 
UW team knows which brokers to exploit and which organizations need to be tied in with 
other organizations to bridges stronger infrastructure. UW teams will not serve 
specifically as the vanguards of the movement per se, but as the groups who identify the 
vanguards of the movement. Then they should focus on linking individuals, groups, and 
formal organization together aimed at fighting the local fight. Once the local level is  
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successful, it raises the likelihood that it influences external communities. In particular, 
continuous local victories will allow the countermovement to spread out to regional and 
international communities. 
Although the majority of the countermovement’s activities will focus on the local 
communities and a regional approach, groups like the International Centre for Political 
Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) and Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) have 
either identified or have been actively working with programs that are aimed at reducing 
the threat of politically motivated violence around the world. Sources like these can serve 
as formal organizations and institutions that UW teams can link local connective tissues 
into. These programs already work with local communities to promote moderate Islam or 
deter VEMs.
181
 By linking institutions like these with local influential brokers, the 
countermovement will receive additional resources and support with engaging the 
populace. This will also allow for formal organizations and institutions the access to 
survive within the local societies during times of unfavorable conditions associated with 
the cycle of contention.  
C. CONCLUSION 
Al-Qa’ida is a robust transnational organization with many strengths. It has 
proved to be very resilient against past strategies to disrupt or destroy the organization’s 
infrastructure, to include its command, control, and finances. However, through 
understanding the political process model, we realize that Al-Qa’ida is inherently a social 
movement, more specifically a VEM. Therefore, Al-Qa’ida has vulnerabilities as all 
movements do. By understanding how social movements rise and fall due to internal and 
external factors, a strategy can be fashioned to manipulate the necessary conditions for 
Al-Qa’ida to collapse. It is also understood that all movements are continually in a 
constant state of contention with either a regime or more importantly, countermovements. 
From the interactions within the cycle of contention, a general consensus will emerge. 
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Whether or not that consensus is a radical, moderate, or hybrid consensus depends on 
how the actors interact in terms of pilfering key brokers from neutral and oppositional 
parties as well as maintaining indigenous support. 
As discussed, there is currently an opportunity to take advantage of the current 
state of affairs regarding the Muslim world. The existence of a counter-culture against the 
ideology of Al-Qa’ida is already present. The only thing lacking is the mechanism to 
stimulate “collective action” against Al-Qa’ida. With this in mind I return back to my 
three hypothesis.  
My first hypothesis is that a countermovement must identify and exploit positive 
shifts in the socio-political environment to steal and align with more powerful political 
groups and brokers from oppositional and neutral parties than the targeted movement. 
This is supported by Hamas’ interaction with the PLO. Although Hamas had a 
respectable fraction of Palestinian support, it was not viewed as a political or social 
contender until conditions were established that facilitated Hamas’ efforts of gaining 
popular support from the PLO. SOI also became more effective and successful once 
individuals and groups were changing sides and fighting against AQI rather than 
supporting the AQI campaign against the U.S. and Coalition forces. 
My second hypothesis suggests that a countermovement must not rely solely on 
indigenous organizations, it must steal influential brokers from oppositional and neutral 
parties. The integration of additional brokers into a “complex” organizational structure 
will facilitate the mobilization and sustainment of a countermovement. This hypothesis 
holds true based upon the analysis provided in this thesis. The countermovements that 
pilfered influential brokers from the oppositional movement grew while the targeted 
movement lost support and resources from critical brokers. SOI was able to steal key 
brokers from AQI, which allowed the organization to grow and afforded the 
countermovement with valuable information, resources, and access into local 
communities. At the same time, AQI’s loss of the brokers led to a fragmented 
organization that lost resources and popular support. Hamas also won over key brokers to 
gain support of the populace. During the transition of brokers, the PLO lost essential 
support and resources, which led to PLO’s loss in the legislative elections. The PLO also 
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lost the Palestinian communities in the Gaza strip to Hamas. In contrast to the previous 
two countermovements, anti-Zapatistas did not pilfer essential brokers from the 
oppositional movement. The Zapatista movement was never fragmented or pressured to 
in-fighting, which allowed the EZLN/Zapatistas to survive within its informal networks 
during unfavorable conditions. Furthermore, the targeted movement continues to survive 
as an autonomous entity separate of Mexican politics. 
 My third hypothesis claims that in order for a countermovement to win over 
brokers, it must establish an effective counter-narrative and framing process. SOI and 
Hamas demonstrated their capacity to form a broad and pragmatic narrative that allowed 
for more than a select few organizations to join. Moreover, their counter-narratives 
directly attacked the target movement’s ideology, which was further supported by a 
framing process that highlighted vulnerabilities and blunders of the targeted 
organizations. SOI attacked AQI’s credibility of fighting for the people when the 
organizations consistently assassinated and pillaged Sunni tribesmen and towns. Hamas 
took advantage of the failed Oslo accords to highlight the PLO’s ineffectiveness. 
Whereas, the counter-Zapatista movement never effectively established a robust counter 
to EZLN/Zapatistas’ elaborate information campaign. The failure to do so helped the 
Zapatistas to gain sympathy and support from within the international community. 
In addition to my theoretical analysis, through my analysis of the case studies, I 
found that a sponsor-countermovement relationship can affect the outcome of success in 
countermobilization. A sponsor must establish and maintain some form of influence or 
control to either limit the size and power of a countermovement or to control its sense of 
direction and consciousness. The avoidance of this particular factor has the potential to 
present major problems in the long-term process. Israel did not have any form of control 
or influence over Hamas, and although Hamas severely disrupted the PLO’s operations, 
Hamas turned out to be a large threat rather than a benefit in the future. Furthermore, if a 
sponsor promotes an overaggressive method of interacting with a movement, it could 
have negative consequences for the countermovement’s overall strategy. This is 
supported by the Zapatista case study. The anti-Zapatista movement was characterized as 
the aggressor in the contention, because of initial actions conducted by the Mexican 
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government and the subsequent violent actions conducted by the paramilitary forces. The 
results of their interactions hampered any attempt to try and steal brokers from the 
oppositional movement. 
The aforementioned sponsor-countermovement relationships are opposite of U.S. 
forces interaction with SOI. U.S. forces maintained control over SOI’s role, training, and 
implementation in countering AQI. This interaction facilitated actions to ensure SOI did 
not become more influential or powerful than GOI. However, the limitations established 
on SOI did dot gravely affect their capacity to aid in the neutralization of AQI. 
Therefore, with regard to a strategy against Al-Qa’ida it is important to 
understand the factors involved in countermobilization. If a UW effort consisting of 
educated teams armed with the knowledge of social networking and the cultural/social 
environment could be inserted into key areas of interests, Al-Qa’ida can be engaged at 
multiple levels of contention. This strategy would have a significant impact in disrupting 
or even neutralizing Al-Qa’ida’s ideology and the violent extremist movement altogether. 
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